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It all comes down to this. After seven games, arguablyone of
the best series in NBA Finalshistory, the Trail Blazers and
Knicks are tied at 98 with no time left on the clock. Detlef
Schrempf, acquired last summer from the Sonics, is at the
line. He can win it allfor the Blazers in front of their home
fans if he hits thisfree throw. He steps to the line.., dribbles
twice... takes a deep breath.., the shot is up... THE
CROWD IS ON ITS FEET...
This scene would be a dream come true for fans of the Portland Trail
Blazers who have not seen their team win a National Basketball
Association championship since 1977.2 But it would be a nightmare for
some of the fans who had purchased tickets for the game at Portland's
four-year-old arena, the Rose Garden. Not because they doubted that
Schrempf-a thirteen-year veteran, three-time All Star, winner of two
NBA Sixth Man awards and a career eighty percent free throw shooter- - -2

1. See NBA.com, Blazers: Team History (visited Aug. 25, 1999)
<http://www.nba.com/blazers/00400443.html#6>.
2. Playerfile: Detlef Schrempf (visited
Aug.
25,
1999)

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss3/1

4

Milani: "Oh, Say, Can I See--And Who Do I Sue if I Can't?": Wheelchair Us
ARCHITECTLIABILTY UNDER THE ADA

would miss, but because instead of seeing Schrempf s shot they could see
"only the backs (or backsides) of those standing in front of them."3 These
fans use wheelchairs, and spectators standing in front of them would block
their view.
A nonprofit advocacy organization for the disabled and an attorney with
a disability tried to prevent this nightmare by suing the Rose Garden's
owners to require them to comply with the Department of Justice's (DOJ)
' Technical Assistance Manual" on the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)4 which requires sports arenas to be built with seating areas which
provide wheelchair users with sightlines over standing spectators.' The
court, while recognizing that DOJ's position was a reasonable
interpretation of a regulation it had issued under the ADA, held that the
interpretation was invalid because it had not been subject to notice and
comment as required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).6
Part I of this Article discusses the Rose Garden case and other decisions
on the sightlines over standing spectators issue, and concludes that the
IndependentLiving Resources court was wrong. More specifically, it will
argue that DOJ's position is reasonable and thus subject to judicial
deference; 7 that the Technical Assistance Manual's interpretation of the
regulation was an interpretive rule exempt from the APA's notice and
comment requirements;8 and that decisions requiring only "substantial
compliance" with the sightlines over standing spectators requirement are
inconsistent with the ADA's language and intent. 9
Part I of the Article will then discuss which parties can be held
responsible for making sure that this requirement-and all regulations

<http://www.nba.com/playerfile/detlefschrempf.html>. Schrempf, possibly the best player ever
to come out of Germany, won the Sixth Man awards while with the Indiana Pacers, and had his last
All Star season in 1996-97 with the Seattle Supersonics. Fans of ESPN's SportsCenterknow him
best, however, because of the distinctive way anchor Dan Patrick pronounces his name. See KErIH
OLBERMAN & DAN PATRICK, THE BIG SHOW: A TRIBUTE To ESPN'S SPORTSCENTER 13 (1997).
3. Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698,732-33 (D. Or.

1997).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
5. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE AMERICANS wrrH DISAIBILTIES ACT
TECHNICALASSISTANCE MANUAL § HI-7.5180 (Supp. 1994) ("in assembly areas where spectators
can be expected to stand during the event or show being viewed, the wheelchair locations must
provide lines of sight over spectators who stand").
6. Independent Living Resources, 982 F. Supp. at 740-41 (discussing requirements of 5

U.S.C. § 533 (1994)).
7. See infra notes 172-92 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 193-209 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 210-34 and accompanying text (disagreeing with Paralyzed Veterans of
Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, P.C., 950 F. Supp. 393,398 (D.D.C. 1996), aff'd sub
nom. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied
sub nom. Pollin v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 118 S. Ct. 1184 (1998)).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAWREWEW

[Vol. 52

concerning the accessibility of new buildings-are met. Specifically, it will
argue that the language requiring those who "design and construct" new
buildings to make them accessible'0 should be broadly construed and is not
limited to a facility's owners, operators, lessors and lessees,1 ' and that a
conjunctive reading of "design and construct" can cover architects and
franchisors who have a significant degree of control over a facility's design
and construction. 2
I. WHEELCHAIR SEATING IN ARENAS AND STADIuMS-IS THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE' S REQUIREMENT THAT WHEELCHAIR SEATING LOCATIONS HAVE LINES OF SIGHT OVER
STANDING SPECTATORS A VALID INTERPRETATION

OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT?
A. Statutory Language,Access Board, Guidelines,Regulations, and
the Departmentof Justice TechnicalAssistance Manual
Before the ADA was passed, wheelchair users who could not see over
spectators standing in front of them had no choice but to take their
dilemma "sitting down" in the literal sense, but-armed with the DOJ's
interpretation of the statute-they have now begun to "stand up" for their
rights in the figurative sense. They have sued arena owners and designers
under Title III of the ADA which states:
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations
of any place of public accommodation by any person who
owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation. 3
More specifically, the ADA requires that facilities built after January 26,
1993, must be "readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities."14 Congress gave DOJ the authority to flesh out the statute's
general principles by issuing regulations, "includ[ing] standards applicable
to facilities."' 5
The accessibility regulations were adopted through an unusual two-step

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

42 U.S.C. § 12183(a).
See infranotes 298-308 and accompanying text.
See infranotes 309-58 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
Id. § 12183(a)(1).
Id. § 12186(b).
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process. Congress placed the initial drafting responsibility on the
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, more
commonly known as the Access Board. 16 DOJ was then required to issue
regulations "consistent with the minimum guidelines and requirements
issued by" the Access Board.' 7

Among other things, the final regulations issued by DOJ provide a
formula for determining how many wheelchair seating areas must be
provided in "assembly areas" such as stadiums or arenas. Where the
facility's seating capacity exceeds 500, six wheelchair locations are
required, plus one additional space for every 100 seats over 500.8 This is
referred to as the "one percent plus one" rule because the number of seats
for wheelchair users equals one percent of the total seating capacity plus
one more location.19
In addition to satisfying the "one percent plus one rule," wheelchair
seating must also meet the criteria in a regulation known as Standard
4.33.3:
Wheelchair areas shall be an integral part of any fixed seating
plan and shall be provided so as to provide people with
physical disabilities a choice of admission prices and lines of
sight comparable to those for members of the general
public.

.

.

. When the seating capacity exceeds 300,

wheelchair spaces shall be provided in more than one
location. 20

This standard contains three separate requirements: sightlines,
16. Id. § 12204(a). The Access Board has 25 members: 13 individuals appointed by the
president, a majority of whom are individuals with disabilities, and representatives of 12
governmental departments or agencies, including the Department of Justice. 29 U.S.C. § 792(a)(1)
(1994). Its responsibilities include "develop[ing] advisory information for," and "establish[ing] and
maintain[ing] minimum [accessibility] guidelines." Id. § 792(b)(2), (3).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(c).
18. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A § 4.1.3(19)(a) (1999).
19. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, P.C. (PVA III), 950
F. Supp. 393, 398 (D.D.C. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P.
(PVA IV), 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub non. Pollin v. Paralyzed Veterans of
Am., 118 S. Ct. 1184 (1998). Two earlier decisions in this case will be discussed below. Paralyzed
Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs (PVA I), 945 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996);
Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, P.C. (PVA II), 950 F. Supp. 389
(D.D.C. 1996).
20. 28 C.F.R. § 4.33.3 (1999) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Standard 4.33.3). If the facility
does not sell the tickets for these wheelchair seating areas, removable or folding seats may be
provided to ambulatory spectators. See id.; see alsoUNrrED STATES DEP'TOFJUSTICE, ACCESSIBLE
STADIUMS 1 (1996) ("Removable or folding seats can be provided in wheelchair seating locations
for use by persons who do not use wheelchairs so the facility does not lose revenue when not all
wheelchair seating locations are ticketed to persons who use wheelchairs.").
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integration, and dispersal.2 ' The sightlines requirement is that wheelchair
seating must have "lines of sight comparable to those for members of the
general public."'2 2 The integration requirement states that wheelchair
seating must "be an integral part of any fixed seating plan, ' 23 and is
intended to bar seating plans which create "vast wastelands within which
one or two isolated wheelchair patrons will be seated." 24 Finally, the
dispersal requirement states that "[w]hen the seating capacity exceeds 300,
wheelchair spaces shall be provided in more than one location."25 It is
intended to give wheelchair users a choice among various locations and
ticket prices.26
Standard 4.33.3's language was originally drafted by the Access Board
as part of its proposed accessibility guidelines in January 1991. The
Board's commentary stated that wheelchair seating should be "located to
provide lines of sight comparable to those for all viewing areas."27 It noted,
however, that this wording "may not suffice in sports arenas or race tracks
where the audience frequently stands throughout a large portion of the
game or event" and solicited comments on "whether full lines of sight over
standing spectators.., should be required. '28 DOJ issued its own notice of
proposed rulemaking one month later, stating that it intended to adopt the
Access Board's guidelines as the accessibility standard applicable to the
ADA and
that any comments on those guidelines should be sent to the
29
Board.
In July 1991, the Access Board issued the Americans with Disabilities
Act Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG) which included a guideline on
wheelchair seating areas which essentially followed the proposal, but
omitted any reference to the standing spectatdr problem. 30 Although
"[m]any commenters ... [had] recommended that lines of sight should be
provided over standing spectators," the Board recommended only "lines of
sight comparable to those available to the rest of the public," and stated
that it would address the lines of sight over standing spectators question
later when it drafted the guidelines for recreational facilities.3' Later that

21. PVA III, 950 F. Supp. at 399.
22. Standard 4.33.3.
23. Id.
24. PVA 11, 950 F. Supp. at 402.
25. Standard 4.33.3.
26. PVA III, 950 F. Supp. at 404 (explaining that "[d]ispersal requires a choice of various
seating areas, good and bad, expensive and inexpensive, which generally matches those of
ambulatory spectators").
27. 56 Fed. Reg. 2296,2314(1991).
28. Id.
29. 56 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7478-79 (1991).
30. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,408 (1991) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 1191, app. A).
31. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,440 (1991); see also 56 Fed. Reg. 60,618 (1991).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss3/1
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same day, DOJ adopted the ADAAG as its own regulations, entitled the
Justice Department's Standards for Accessible Design (JDSAD).32
Standard 4.33.3 of the JDSAD was worded identically to the Access Board
guideline.
Unlike the Access Board, however, DOJ made no statement on whether
the standard's "comparable" lines of sight language required sightlines
over standing spectators. DOJ officials, however, soon issued several,
sometimes contradictory, statements on the issue. In a 1992 speech at a
Major League Baseball stadium operators' conference, the deputy chief of
DOJ's Public Access Section said that "[t]here is no requirement of line of
sight over standing spectators., 33 In mid-1993, however, DOJ initiated an
investigation on the accessibility of venues for the 1996 summer Olympic
games in Atlanta, and took the position that "lines of sight comparable to
those for members of the general public" meant "line[s] of sight over
It also took this position in subsequent
standing spectators."'
communications with the Access Board.35
32. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,544, 35,586 (1991) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A).
33. PVA IV, 117 F.3d at 581.
34. Id. The Olympics investigation was settled in May 1996 with an agreement that identified
the Olympic Stadium as "the most accessible stadium in the world," in part because "virtually all
wheelchair seats have a comparable 'line of sight,' so that wheelchairusers can still see the playing
surface even when spectators in front of them stand up during the event." Id. at 581 n.1. The full
text of the settlement agreements for the Olympic Stadium, Olympic Aquatic Center, and Olympic
Tennis Center, respectively, can be found at Settlement Agreement Concerning the Olympic
Stadium (visited July 12, 1999) <http:llwww.usdoj.gov/crtladalstadiumo.htm>; Settlement
Agreement Concerning the Olympic Aquatic Center (visited July 12, 1999)
<http:llwww.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/aquatic.htm>; SettlementAgreement Concerningthe Olympic Tennis
Center(visited July 12, 1999) <http:llwww.usdoj.gov/crtlada/tennis.htm>.
35. Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 744 (D. Or.
1997). The Access Board informally circulated a draft of a proposed amendment to ADAAG 4.33.3
in March 1994 which would have required that only 70% of wheelchair seats have sightlines over
standing spectators. After DOJ responded that the figure should be 100%, the Board's executive
director wrote the assistant attorney general in charge of DOJ's Civil Rights Division saying that
the Board had not yet adopted the 70% requirement and would consult with DOJ in drafting the
final rule. Id.
Later that year, commentary published with the Access Board's interim final rule covering
facilities owned by state and local governments stated that it was conducting research on "the
design issues associated with providing integrated and dispersed accessible seating locations.. .. "
59 Fed. Reg. 31,676,31,679 (1994). The Board stated that it would "address issues associated with
assembly areas in a separate rulemaking once this research is completed." Id. Despite this statement,
however, the sightline issue was still not covered when the Access Board published its notice of
draft recreational guidelines. 59 Fed. Reg. 48, 542 (1994). Nor was it addressed when the Board
issued its notice of proposed rulemaking on recreational facilities on July 9, 1999. 64 Fed. Reg.
373,268 (1999).
The sightlines issue was finally addressed when the Access Board issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking on revisions and additions to the ADAAG. 64 Fed. Reg. 62,248 (1999). The proposed
rules were based on recommendations made by the ADAAG Review Advisory Committee, which
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In its first "Americans with Disabilities Act Title I Technical
Assistance Manual" (TAM), and successive annual supplements, DOJ said
nothing about sightlines over standing spectators. In December 1994,
however, it published, without notice and comment, a supplement which
explicitly stated that the "lines of sight comparable" language required
sightlines over standing spectators.36 Given the history of Standard 4.33.3,
it is not surprising that courts are split over whether they should give
deference to DOJ's interpretation of the regulation.37

was formed in 1994 and consisted of 22 members including representatives from "the design and
construction industry, the building code community, State and local government entities, and
people with disabilities." Id. at 62,249 (the proposed rules can also be found at ADA/ABA
Accessibility GuidelinesNPRM Index (visited Dec. 20, 1999) <http:llwww.access-board.gov/adaaba/guidenprm.htm>). Comments on the proposed rules were due by May 15, 2000. 65 Fed. Reg.
12,493 (2000).
Among the proposed new rules was one specifically dealing with lines of sight in stadiums and
arenas. The proposed ADAAG 802.9 states that "[s]pectators seated in wheelchairs shall be
provided lines of sight comparable to those provided to other spectators." 64 Fed. Reg. 62,501
(1999). Two subsections are more specific. The proposed ADAAG 802.9.1 covers "Comparable
Lines of Sight for Seated Spectators" and states:
Where spectators are expected to remain seated during events, spectators seated
in wheelchairs shall be provided with lines of sight to the performance area or
playing field comparable to that provided to spectators in the seating area in
closest proximity to the location of the wheelchairspaces, but not in the same row.
Id. Proposed ADAAG 802.9.2 governs "Comparable Lines ofSight Over Standing Spectators" and
states that
[w]here people will be expected to stand at their seats during events, wheelchair
spaces shall be located so that they will provide people seated in wheelchairswith
lines of sight of the performance area or playing surface over standing spectators
comparable to that provided to standing spectators in the seating area in closest
proximity to the wheelchairspaces, but not in the same row.
Id. at 62,501-02 (these regulations also can be found at Special Rooms, Spaces and Elements
(visited Dec. 20, 1999) <http:llwww.access-board.gov/ada-abalhtmlltech-08.html>).
36. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TITLE
III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL § 111-7.5180 (Supp. 1994) ("In assembly areas where
spectators can be expected to stand during the event or show being viewed, the wheelchair locations
must provide lines of sight over spectators who stand."). The TAM also can be found at ADA Title
1999)
12,
III Technical Assistance Manual (visited July
<http://www.usdoj.gov/crtlada/taman3.html>. The 1994 supplement is atADA TechnicalAssistance
Manual1994 Supplement (visited July 12, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/crtlada/taman3up.html>.
DOJ also took this position in a four-page publication devoted exclusively to sports stadiums.
UNITEDSTATES DEPARTMENTOFJUSTICE,ACCESSIBLESTADIUMS (1996). This publication can also
be found at Untitled (visited July 12, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/crtladalstadium.txt> or
<http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/stadium.pdf>.
37. See, e.g., Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, P.C. (PVA
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B. Cases GrantingDeference to DOJ Standard4.33.3 and
RequiringLines of Sight Over Standing Spectators
1. District Court Decisions on the MCI Center
The first court to address the issue granted deference to DOJ's 1994
TAM interpretation of Standard 4.33.3 requiring enhanced sightlines, but
did so reluctantly.38 The court specifically criticized the government for not
providing any expertise regarding its interpretation and ruled against the
defendants despite acknowledging that they acted in "good faith" in
designing and constructing an arena with the belief that the ADA did not
require that wheelchair seating must have enhanced sightlines. 9
The PVA case concerned the MCI Center, an arena being built for the
National Basketball Association's Washington Wizards (formerly the
Bullets) and the National Hockey League's Washington Capitals. The
PVA 4° and several individual wheelchair users sued Ellerbe Becket, the
architecture firm which designed the arena, alleging that the proposed
design violated the DOJ regulations on accessible seating. They also sued

II), 950 F. Supp. 389 (D.D.C. 1996) (deferring to DOJ interpretation), affd sub nom. Paralyzed
Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding trial court's order
enforcing DOJ interpretation) (PVA IV), cert. denied sub nom. Pollin v. Paralyzed Veterans of
Am., 523 U.S. 1003 (1998); United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Minn.
1997) (granting deference to DOJ sightline regulation); Fiedler v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc.,
871 F. Supp. 35 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that regulation permitting "cluster" wheelchair seating in
theater areas "having sight lines that require slopes of greater than 5 percent" did not permit single
level wheelchair seating); Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698
(D. Or. 1997) (rejecting DOJ interpretation of its regulation due to failure to comply with notice
and hearing requirements of Administrative Procedure Act). For law review coverage of this issue,
see Mark A. Conrad, Wheeling Through Rough Terrain-TheLegalRoadblocks ofDisabledAccess
in Sports Arenas, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 263 (1998); Katherine C. Carlson, Note, Down in Front:
Entertainment Facilities and DisabledAccess Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 20
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 897 (1998); Jonathan C. Fritts, Note, "Down in Front!":Judicial
Deference, Regulatory Interpretationand the ADA's Line of Sight Standard,86 GEO. L.J. 2653
(1998).
38. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, P.C. (PVA II), 950 F.
Supp. 389 (D.D.C. 1996), aff dsub nom. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P. (PVA IV),
117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. deniedsubnom. Pollinv. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 523 U.S.
1003 (1998).
39. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, P.C. (PVA I1), 950
F. Supp. 393, 394 (D.D.C. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P.
(PVA IV), 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Pollin v. Paralyzed Veterans of
Am., 523 U.S. 1003 (1998).
40. The PVA is a nationwide membership organization chartered by Congress just after
World War II. 36 U.S.C. § 1151. Almost all of its 17,000 members use wheelchairs. PVA III, 950
F. Supp. at 396.
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the team's owner, Abe Pollin, and several corporations or partnerships
which would own or operate the MCI Center, including D.C. Arena, L.P.,
which had a lease to operate the building for thirty years, with the
possibility of two ten-year extensions.
A month after DOJ issued the TAM supplement requiring sightlines
over standing spectators, these defendants, referred to here collectively as
"D.C. Arena," chose four seating "bowls" for sporting and entertainment
events at the MCI Center: one each for hockey and basketball games and
two for concerts.41 The court noted that in designing these bowls D.C.
Arena "desire[d] to construct an arena which [met] the needs of wheelchair
patrons and which provide[d] the best possible sightlines to all patrons,
ambulatory and nonambulatory" and that the arena "offer[ed] more
wheelchair spaces with enhanced sightlines, and more choices of location,
than any other constructed to this date." 42 The wheelchair seating areas
satisfied the "one percent plus one" rule and included a variety of
admission prices and locations.43 Some of the wheelchair seating in the
chosen designs, however, did not have lines of sight over standing
spectators. 4
The PVA alleged that the MCI Center's design violated Standard
4.33.3's requirements that wheelchair seating be integrated with other
seating, be dispersed throughout the facility, and, as interpreted by DOJ,
provide sightlines over standing spectators. D.C. Arena responded that the
seating bowls complied with the integration and dispersal requirements,
and that Standard 4.33.3 did not require sightlines over standing
spectators. 45
As discussed more fully below, 46 the court dismissed the suit against
Ellerbe Becket, holding that architects are not subject to liability under the
ADA.47 In two separate opinions, however, it denied the remaining
defendants' motions for summary judgment.

41. PVA III, 950 F. Supp. at 397.
42. Id. at 394.
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 390-91. DOJ refused to intervene in the case despite several invitations by the
district judge and its own enforcement authority under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b). See id. It did
participate as amicus but the district court only granted it leave to file a brief and did not allow it
to participate at oral argument; the court also refused to allow DOJ's request to file a second brief
to respond to D.C. Arena's arguments concerning DOi's "interpretation and enforcement of... the
ADA's Standards for Accessible Design." PVA IV, 117 F.3d at 582.
46. See infra notes 309-50 and accompanying text.
47. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs (PVA I), 945 F. Supp.
1,2 (D.D.C. 1996), aff'd on othergroundssub nom. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P.,
117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert.denied sub nom. Pollin v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 523 U.S.
1003 (1998).
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a. DOJ's Interpretation Requiring Sightlines Over
Standing Spectators Is Entitled to Deference
The first opinion focused solely on the sightlines over standing
spectators issue and concluded that the TAM interpretation of DOJ's own
regulation was entitled to judicial deference.48 D.C. Arena had argued that
the "lines of sight comparable" language was similar to that contained in
older standards, including one issued by the Access Board, and had been
historically interpreted within the industry to require only a line of sight
over seated spectators. It further argued that the Access Board's
commentary showed it had specifically declined to read the language to
require enhanced sightlines. 49
The court acknowledged that the Access Board had never taken a
position on the sightlines over standing spectators question but said that
this was immaterial because "the Board is not the authoritative agency on
this matter. Under the ADA, the Board is merely given the role of setting
the minimum guidelines for the Attorney General's regulations to
follow."' While DOJ adopted the Access Board's guidelines as its own
regulations, "it may still adopt different interpretations of those regulations,
so long as they are 'consistent' with the Board's guidelines. 5' The court
held that "[t]he views of the Board or of any other entity are not
authoritative. Whether the Justice Department wrote the language of the
regulation itself or merely adopted the language from another source,
[Standard] 4.33.3 is its regulation alone, and the Justice Department stands
as its principle arbiter.' '5 2 Moreover, because the ADA is a remedial statute
which changed existing law, DOJ could assert a position which was
different from historical interpretations within the design and construction
industry. 3
The court granted deference to DOJ's interpretation, noting that
agencies are empowered to interpret their own regulations as "long as such
interpretation is reasonable in light of the text and purpose of the statute
and consistent with the statute and regulation."' The court held that a
"reasonable arbiter" could define Standard 4.33.3's "comparable" sightlines
requirement to mean sightlines over standing spectators, and that this

48. PVA II, 950 F. Supp. at 392.
49. Id. at 391.
50. Id.
51. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12186(c)).
52. Id. at 392. The court noted that the judge in Fiedler v. American Multi-Cinema, 871 F.
Supp. 35, 39 (D.D.C. 1994), had stated in dicta that DOJ is both the author and principal arbiter
of Standard 4.33.3. See PVA 11, 950 F. Supp. at 392 n.9.
53. PVA II, 950 F. Supp. at 391.
54. Id. (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 514-15 (1994)).
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interpretation was consistent with both the language of the regulation and
the ADA itself 55 Accordingly, it held as a matter of law that DOJ's
interpretation of Standard 4.33.3 was binding under the ADA, and D.C.
Arena was required to "construct an arena in which substantially all
wheelchair locations have an enhanced line of sight over standing
spectators. 56
b. "Substantial Compliance" with the Sightlines
Requirement Was Sufficient
The district court's second decision in the PVA case held that the
wheelchair seating in the proposed design for the MCI Center was
sufficiently integrated with other seating, but was not adequately
dispersed. 7 It also held that the regulation did not require all wheelchair
seating to have sightlines over standing spectators. Instead, D.C. Arena
could satisfy the standard through "substantial compliance., 58 The court
noted that DOJ had not insisted on full compliance with the enhanced
sightline provision in its publications or in its settlements concerning
venues for the Atlanta Olympics. The 1996 Accessible Stadiums release
stated only that "all or substantially all" wheelchair seats provide enhanced
sightlines.5 9 And, the settlements on the Atlanta Olympic facilities,
demonstrated a "flexible approach" which "offers at best substantial
compliance with the ideals expressed in the 1994 TAM and 1996
Accessible Stadiums release." 6" For example, the lower deck of the Atlanta
Olympic Stadium has dispersed seating with enhanced lines of sight, but
there are no wheelchair spaces in the 15,000 seats in the upper deck and
wheelchair spaces on the Club level provide clear lines of sight only for the
tallest of wheelchair users. The court stated that substantial compliance
was achieved "by masking the deficiencies in the cheapest seats and
offering wheelchair patrons seating in the fully compliant lower deck for

55. Id.

56. Id.The court also rejected D.C. Arena's argument that theTAM was not binding because
it was an illegal rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court said that while this
contention could have merit, it did not impact this case, because "the TAM is only one indication
of a general Justice Department interpretation of Standard 4.33.3. The validity of the TAM
provisions as authority does not affect the interpretation of Standard 4.33.3, which all parties agree
is binding authority." Id. at 392 n.8.
57. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, P.C. (PVA III), 950
F. Supp. 393,405 (D.D.C. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P.,
117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. deniedsubnom. Pollin v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 523 U.S.
1003 (1998).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 399 (discussing UNrIEDSTATES DEP'TOFJUSnTCE,ACCESSIBLESTADIUMS (1996)).
60. Id. at 400.
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the price of an upper deck ticket." 6'
Accordingly, the PVA III court held that while the MCI Center must
provide seating with sightlines over standing spectators, "it is clear that
these requirements are flexibly applied." 62 It further stated that "paramount
within this flexible approach is the concept of substantial compliance,
especially in regard to sightlines," and "a facility is in compliance with the
ADA regulations if a substantial percentage of seats provide these
sightlines. ' , 63 The court stated, however, that it was not its role to define
"substantial percentage" in "arbitrary, numerical terms. '64 Instead, courts
must examine proposed designs and determine whether they meet the
flexible substantial compliance test. The court concluded that the proposed
design for the MCI Center, before it at that time, did not have enough
enhanced sightline seats to comply with the ADA regulations. It
subsequently stated that a design which would provide sightlines over
standing spectators in 78% of the wheelchair seating in one of the seating
bowls, and 85% to 88% in the other three configurations was in substantial
compliance with the sightlines requirement but failed to meet the dispersal
requirement. 61
It did so after first specifically rejecting two proposals for bringing the
original design of the MCI Center, where less than forty percent of the
wheelchair spaces provided unobstructed sightlines, into compliance
without structural changes. The court referred to these proposals as the
"no-stand" and "no-sell" policies.6 6 The "no-stand" policy (referred to by
D.C. Arena as the "educational and enforcement policy") called for the
MCI Center to make efforts to discourage spectators seated in front of
wheelchair patrons from standing up during play. Signs would be posted
describing the policy, and employees would be stationed to remind people
not to stand up in front of wheelchair patrons. The court rejected this as an
61. Id. The seating at the Olympic Aquatic Center was also not compliant, but substantial
compliance was achieved when wheelchair patrons were relocated to better seats and seats in front
of them were left unsold. Id.
62. Id. at 401.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. PVA IV, 117 F.3d at 582. The original design for the MCI Center called for four different
configurations: '"Basketball," "Hockey," "360 Stage," and "270 Stage." PVA III, 950 F. Supp. at
397. Each had a different number of total seats and available wheelchair seats spread over three
seating levels open to the general public: the lower bowl, the club level, and the upper bowl. Id.
Several seats in each configuration provided a line of sight over standing spectators: the basketball
and 360 stage configurations included 71 seats at the lower and club level which were in
compliance with ADA regulations, and the hockey and 270 stage configurations had 70 and 41 such
seats, respectively. Id. The major disagreement between the PVA and D.C. Arena concerned the
compliance of 72 upper bowl seats and whether 110 wheelchair seats in the private luxury suites
should be included in determining ADA compliance. Id.
66. PVA III, 950 F. Supp. at 402.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 1
FLORDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 52

"operational" rather than a "design" solution, stating it did not comply with
the ADA's requirement that the facility's design and construction must
provide the access. The plan also would mean that people with disabilities
would be singled out for attention and possibly worse. And, D.C. Arena
showed little willingness to enforce the policy, stating that it would not
eject patrons who violated it.67
The court also rejected the "no-sell" policy, which called for the D.C.
Arena to withhold seats in front of wheelchair patrons from sale, though
it did indicate it would accept this plan with some revisions. The unsold
seats would be covered or removed to prevent able-bodied patrons from
moving down into them once the game had started. The PVA's expert
conceded that this policy was similar to a design solution to the sightline
problem and not merely an operational measure. The policy assured
wheelchair patrons an enhanced sightline because no one could sit in front
' 68
of them and would also "prevent potential ugliness from resulting.
Moreover, DOJ had approved this policy for one of the venues at the 1996
Atlanta Olympics. 69 Accordingly, the court concluded that the "no-sell"
policy could bring more wheelchair seats into compliance with the
regulation.7'
The court ruled that even this proposal, however, did not provide proper
access in the lower sections of the MCI Center because of the inadequate
dispersal of seats there.71 Unlike the top level where seating was distributed
equally throughout the bowl and only needed to have enhanced sightlines,
the lower level had almost no wheelchair spaces in the center sections. The
only enhanced sightline sections were in the comers, prompting the court
to state that the "spaces in the lower and club levels are ghettoized in the
end zone areas. 72 It concluded that, as designed, the MCI Center was not
"readily accessible to and usable by" wheelchair users as required by the
ADA.73
The court required D.C. Arena to submit proposed design changes
within thirty days of the decision. The revised plan increased the
percentage of general seating wheelchair spaces with enhanced sightlines
and would implement a "no-sale" for the upper deck seats, withholding
seats in a prior row from sale.74 The plan also increased the number of front
67. Id. at403n.21.
68. Id. at 403.
69. Id.
70. Id. Most of those seats were in the upper bowl of the arena, and such a solution would
achieve enhanced sightlines in 79% of the reiluired basketball spaces, in 77% of the 360 stage
spaces, 82% of the hockey spaces, and in 62% of the 270 stage spaces. Id. at 403-04 n.23.
71. Id. at 404.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 405.
74. Conrad, supra note 37, at 276 (citing Defendants' Plan Pursuant to the Court's Order of
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row wheelchair spaces in the center area of the lower bowl, but did not add
any more enhanced seating.75 The court rejected the revised seating plan
stating that it still did not comply with the ADA because there were not
enough enhanced view seats in the center court area of the lower level.76
It also concluded that seating in the revised design was not "sufficiently
dispersed throughout the center court locations of the Lower Bowl"77 and
ordered that a new plan be submitted within fifteen days.
D.C. Arena requested a reconsideration of the first plan and, in the
alternative, offered a second compliance plan where a "roll-forward"
mechanism would be utilized to provide enhanced wheelchair spaces in the
center court area back from the playing surface.78 The court also rejected
this plan, and both D.C. Arena and the PVA appealed.
2. D.C. Circuit Decision on the MCI Center
On appeal D.C. Arena argued the district court erred in reading
Standard 4.33.3 to require any wheelchair seating areas sightlines over
standing spectators while PVA argued that it erred in not requiring that all
wheelchair seating have such sightlines.79 The D.C. Circuit agreed with the
PVA, rejecting each of D.C. Arena's arguments, and noting that the games
and events at the MCI Center were supposed to be "exciting affairs" and
spectators would be "expected, even encouraged at times, to stand and
cheer for the home teams."80
a. Standard 4.33.3's "Lines of Sight" Language Referred
to an Unobstructed View and Was Not Merely
Part of the Dispersal Requirement
First, D.C. Arena argued that the language of the regulation simply did

Dec. 20, 1996, Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, P.C., No. 961354, at 3 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 1997)).
75. Id. (citing Defendants' Plan Pursuant to the Court's Order of Dec. 20, 1996, Paralyzed
Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, P.C., No. 96-1354, at 3-4 (D.D.C. Feb. 19,
1997)).
76. Id. (citing Order, Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, P.C.,
No. 96-1354, at 2 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 1997)).
77. Id. (citing Order, Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe BecketArchitects & Eng'rs, P.C.,
No. 96-1354, at 2 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 1997)). The court did hold that the wheelchair seating in the
other levels of the arena complied with the ADA. Id.
78. Id. (citing Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Reconsideration Or, In the
Alternative, For Acceptance for First Amended Plan, Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket
Architects & Eng'rs, P.C., No. 96-1354 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 1997)).
79. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P. (PVA IV), 117 F.3d 579,582 (D.C. Cir.
1997), cert. denied sub norn. Pollin v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 118 S. Ct. 1184 (1998).
80. Id. at 580.
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not support DOJ's interpretation that it required sightlines over standing
spectators. It asserted that the phrase "lines of sight comparable to those for
members of the general public" meant only that wheelchair seating areas
should be dispersed so that different geographical locations within a
facility are available to wheelchair users. PVA and DOJ pointed out,
however, that the regulation already accomplished the dispersal objective
by requiring facilities with over 300 seats to provide wheelchair seating "in
more than one location" and to give wheelchair users a choice of admission
prices. Therefore, "lines of sight comparable" must have an added
meaning, "and the most obvious is an unobstructed view."'" The court
agreed, stating that "the language 'lines of sight comparable' quite
naturally is interpreted to refer to the ability of a wheelchair user to see a
performance without any obstruction. ' 2
b. "Lines of Sight" Did Not Have an Established Meaning at the Time
Standard 4.33.3 Was Adopted and DOJ's Interpretation
of that Term Was Entitled to Judicial Deference
D.C. Arena next argued that the term "lines of sight comparable" had
gathered a specific meaning by the time it was used in the regulation-a
meaning which differed from the one assigned to it in the TAM. 3 It noted
that the term apparently originated in a guidance issued in 1980 by a
private body, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). D.C.
Arena argued that there was no indication at that time that ANSI intended
the phrase to address the issue of standing spectators. The court noted,
however, that there was not any contrary evidence either. Accordingly,
"there was no uniformly understood construction of the language prior to
the time it was picked up by the [Access] Board and [DOJ] .... The words
simply had not taken on a well-understood meaning." 4 While it was

81. Id. at 583.
82. Id.
83. Id. D.C. Arena did not even concede that the regulation referred to obstructions and
argued that if it did "it certainly does not cover a temporary obstruction caused by standing
spectators." Id.
84. Id. The court held that no authoritative interpretation of the phrase "lines of sight
comparable" was ever issued until the TAM supplement was published in 1994. Id. at 582. It noted
that the Access Board's notice of proposed rulemaking conceded that the guidelines "may not
suffice in sports arenas or race tracks where the audience frequently stands," and solicited
comments on "whether full lines of sight over standing spectators ... should be required." Id. at
581 (quoting 56 Fed. Reg. 2296, 2314 (1991)). Also, the Board's promulgation of the final rule
acknowledged that "[m]any commenters... recommended that lines of sight should be provided
over standing spectators." Id. (quoting 56 Fed. Reg. 35,408,35,440 (1991)). The court said that this
implied that the Board's guideline did not alleviate its concern about the issue. Id. Indeed, it stated
that it intended to address the lines of sight over standing spectators issue at a later date when it
proposed the guidelines for recreational facilities. Id. (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 35,408, 35,440 (1991)).
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possible that the Access Board intended to limit the term to permanent
obstructions, not standing spectators, when it adopted the phrase from
ANSI, the court held that was relevant only on the question of whether the
TAM was "entitled to deference and whether it should be thought a
modification of the regulation; it does not demonstrate that 'lines of sight
comparable' had developed a universally accepted linguistic meaning
contrary to the one [DOJ] asserts., 8 5 Accordingly, the court held that the
phrase "lines of sight comparable" was ambiguous as applied to the
standing spectator issue and turned to the question whether DOJ's
interpretation of it in the TAM was entitled to deference. 6
The PVA Vcourt held that it was, noting that "[a]gency interpretations
of their own regulations have been afforded deference by federal reviewing
courts for a very long time and are sustained unless 'plainly erroneous or
inconsistent' with the regulation." 87 Some courts had even said that such
interpretations are given greater deference when they involve a statute the
agency is entrusted to administer. 88 D.C. Arena, however, argued that
deference was inappropriate because DOJ did not actually draft the
regulation; the Access Board did. In fact, DOJ's notice in the Federal
Register stated that it intended to adopt the Board's standards and that
comments on the proposed guideline should be directed to the Board. D.C.
Arena argued that this suggested that the Access Board controlled the
process through which the language of both the guideline and the
regulation was to be adopted. 9
The court, however, held that DOJ's interpretation was still entitled to
deference.
We do not defer . . . to an administrative agency's
interpretation of its regulation solely because its employees
are the drafters and presumably have superior knowledge as
to what they intended.... [The doctrine of deference is
based primarily on the agency's statutory role as the sponsor
of the regulation, not necessarily on its drafting expertise. 90
The court noted that, under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources

85. Id. at 583.

86. Id. at 583-84.
87. Id. at 584 (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (1994); Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,414 (1945)).
88. Id. (citing Capital Network Sys. v. FCC, 28 F.3d 201,206 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).

89. Id. at 585.
90. Id. (citing Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 110, 112 (1992); Pauley v. BethEnergy

Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680 (1991); American Train Dispatchers Ass'n v. ICC, 54 F.3d 842, 848
(D.C. Cir. 1995)).
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Defense Council,Inc.,9 deference is given to an agency's interpretation of
an ambiguous statute because of its delegated authority to administer the
statute, and reasoned that "the same consideration underlies deference to
an agency's interpretation of its own regulation." 92 More specifically, it
stated that "[t]he resolution of ambiguities in a regulation implicates the
same sort of policy choices it does with regard to a statute . . . and
Congress should therefore be thought to have delegated to agencies the
authority to reconcile regulatory ambiguities." 93
Turning to the case before it, the court said that when DOJ adopted the
Access Board's language as its own regulation, it became solely DOJ's
responsibility.94 The court also noted that as part of its Title III regulatory
responsibility, DOJ is required to "ensure the availability and provision of
appropriate technical assistance manuals."'95 It held that this showed
Congress "contemplated a continuing administration of the regulation that
approaches, if not equates with, the adjudicatory authority of other
statutory schemes. 96
c. DOJ's Interpretation of Standard 4.33.3 Was an "Interpretive"
Rule and Did Not Require Notice and Comment
Under the Administrative Procedure Act
Finally, the court rejected D.C. Arena's "most powerful argument:"'9 7
that DOJ had violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) which
requires agencies to engage in notice and comment before formulating
regulations, 9 a requirement which applies to "repealing" or "amending"
a rule. 99 D.C. Arena argued that DOJ's "present interpretation of the
regulation constitutes a fundamental modification of its previous

91. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
92. PVA IV, 117 F.3d at 585.
93. Id. (citing Pauley,501 U.S. at 697).
94. Id.This distinguished the case from those involving a statute (or regulation) administered
by more than one department or agency. Id.(citing Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc.
v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Wachtel v. OTS, 982 F.2d 581, 585 (D.C. Cir.

1993)).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 12206(c)(3).
96. PVA IV, 117 F.3d at 585; see also United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp.
1262 (D. Minn. 1997) (following PVA IV and granting deference to DOJ interpretation requiring
sightlines over standing spectators). One court granted deference to DOJ's interpretation of
Standard 4.33.3 in a case involving lines of sight and the dispersal of wheelchair seating in a movie
theater. See Fiedler v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 35, 39 (D.D.C. 1994) (noting
that "[a]s the author of the regulation, the Department of Justice is also the principal arbiter as to
its meaning").
97. PVA IV, 117 F.3d at 586.
98. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
99. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5).
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interpretation and, even if it legitimately could have reached the present
interpretation originally, it cannot switch its position merely by revising the
technical manual. ' 'lcO
The court stated that it would be difficult to determine that DOJ did not
subsequently "amend" the regulation in violation of the APA if it had
said-or even clearly adopted-what the Board said when it promulgated
the regulation. "But [DOJ] did not do so in its statement of basis and
purpose. It never referred to the Board's concern, nor did it imply that its
regulation did not address the problem of lines of sight over standing
spectators."'1' The court said that it could be plausibly inferred that DOJ
"deliberately intended the regulation to mean the same thing as did the
Board-but it is not a necessary inference. ' ' "mMoreover, Congress never
mandated that DOJ follow the Board's guidelines. It only required that the
"[s]tandards included in regulations issued under [the facility provisions
of Title III] shall be consistent with the minimum guidelines and
requirements issued by the... Board."' 3 The court held that this did not
prevent DOJ from placing a higher burden on the entities covered by the

100. PVA IV, 117 F.3d at 586. DOJ disputed D.C. Arena's characterization of its initial
treatment of the regulation, but argued that even if its final position was a substantial change from
it "an agency is completely free to change its interpretation of an ambiguous regulation so long as
the regulation reasonably will bear the second interpretation." Id.More specifically, it argued that
agencies had the same discretion to modify the interpretation of a regulation as they did to change
their interpretation of a statute under Chevron.
The court disagreed, holding that there was a difference in agencies' authority to change their
interpretation of ambiguous statutes as opposed to ambiguous regulations. The court said that the
decision in Chevron was based on the premise that Congress had implicitly delegated the authority
to reconcile, within reason, ambiguities in statutes to the agencies and departments charged with
administering them. Id. (citing Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Oil, Chem.
& Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 82, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). This is a continuing
delegation; thus "there is no barrier to an agency altering its initial interpretation to adopt another
reasonable interpretation-even one that represents a new policy response generated by a different
administration." Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 863 (1984)). Under the APA, however, agencies are required to engage in notice and
comment before issuing regulations, a requirement which applies to "repeals" or "amendments."
Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(5)). The court held that "[t]o allow an agency to make a fundamental
change in its interpretation of a substantive regulation without notice and comment obviously would
undermine those APA requirements." Id. (citing Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 514 U.S. 87,
100 (1995) (stating in dicta that APA rulemaking is required where an interpretation "adopt[s] a
new position inconsistent with... existing regulations"); National Family Planning & Reproductive
Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 240.41 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). Accordingly, the court rejected
DOJ's "bold, complete analogy" to Chevron and turned to the question of whether DOJ had violated
the APA by "amending" its regulation without notice and comment. Id.
101. Id. at 587.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12186(c)).
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regulation. "
The court also held that the TAM interpretation was not a "substantive
rule" and, thus, subject to notice and comment. t 5 The court said that the
distinction between "interpretive" and "substantive" rules often turns on
"how tightly the agency's interpretation is drawn linguistically from the
actual language of the statute or rule."'" Where the statute is very general,
"using terms like 'equitable' or 'fair,' and the 'interpretation' really
provides all the guidance, then the latter will more likely be a substantive
regulation."' 0 7 The PVA IV court, however, held that DOJ's position was
based on the actual meaning it attributed to the phrase "lines of sight
comparable"--the "legal base upon which the rule rests."'0 8 It concluded
that "the government arguably could have relied on the regulation itself,
even without the manual interpretation, to seek lines of sight over standing
spectators. In sum, we believe the manual interpretation is not sufficiently
distinct or additive to the regulation to require notice and comment."' '

104. Id. The court made it clear that DOJ could have legitimately reached its present
interpretation at the time the regulation was issued, stating that the proposed regulation gave
adequate notice that it could be interpreted the way DOJ did in the TAM. "Anyone considering the
phrase 'lines of sight comparable' should have thought that it might imply an unobstructed view
over standing spectators." Id. at 585. It also rejected D.C. Arena's reliance on a speech to Major
League Baseball stadium operators where the deputy chief of the Public Access Section of the Civil
Rights Division had said "[t]here is no requirement for line of sight over standing spectators." Id.
The court held that "[a] speech of a mid-level official of an agency... is not the sort of 'fair and
considered judgment' that can be thought of as an authoritative departmental position." Id. at 586.
"It is not equivalent to the technical assistance manual, which 'represented formal agency action
upon which affected parties could reasonably rely, in contrast to the informal, nonauthoritative
nature of what had gone before."' Id. (quoting New York State Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Bowen, 835
F.2d 360, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). The court stated that the speech might have added significance if
the TAM supplement had not been issued before D.C. Arena completed its planning, but it could
not claim to have reasonably relied to its detriment on the speech or any other indication of DOJ's
interpretation where there was no question that it was on notice of the interpretation in the TAM
supplement. Ultimately, the court concluded that DOJ "never authoritatively adopted a position
contrary to its manual interpretation and as such it is a permissible construction of the regulation."
Id.
The court was also unpersuaded by testimony from the Assistant Attorney General in charge
of DOJ's Civil Rights Division that from 1991 until he left office in 1993 "it was never the position
... of [DOJ] that wheelchair locations were required to have lines of sight over spectators... who
spontaneously stand." Id. at 587 n.6. The court said that the testimony was "no more probative than
would be a congressman's post-enactment testimony as to what Congress intended when it passed
legislation." Id. (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 556-67 (1988)).
105. Id. at 587 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (b)(3)(A)).
106. Id. (citing Chamber of Commerce v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464,469 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
107. Id. (citing United States v. Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
108. Id. (quoting United Techs. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714,719-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
109. Id.
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d. "Substantial Compliance" with the Sightlines
Requirement Was Sufficient
While the court held that the TAM rule was a valid interpretive
regulation, it also stated that D.C. Arena could satisfy it through
"substantial compliance," rejecting PVA's argument that all wheelchair
seats should have sightlines over standing spectators." 0 DOJ had argued
in an amicus brief that it permitted substantial compliance "only where (1)
100% compliance is structurally impractical or technically infeasible, or (2)
where standing spectators' views are obstructed by other standing
spectators." ' ' The court, however, noted that DOJ had never indicated in
the TAM whether every single wheelchair had to have a view over
standing spectators, and the 1996 Accessible Stadiums publication stated
that unobstructed sightlines are required only at "all or substantially all"
wheelchair locations."' Also, DOJ had informed the Atlanta Olympics
organizers that it would not settle with them unless "at least a reasonable
number" of the wheelchair seats had lines of sight over standing spectators,
all"
and eventually agreed to settlements which provided that "substantially
3
wheelchair locations would provide unobstructed sightlines."
Based on this, the D.C. Circuit said substantial compliance was
sufficient. It noted that, although a federal court may accept an agency's
interpretation of a statute or regulation set forth only in an amicus brief in
some circumstances, it was not clear whether DOJ could further add to the
interpretation found in the TAM during litigation and "get deference to that
marginally additional interpretation.""' 4 It also rejected the argument that
the substantial compliance standard would "encourage disuniformity of
interpretation of the regulation.""' 5 It stated that this argument overlooked
DOJ's authority to clarify its position by putting out an amendment to the
manual. Accordingly, it affirmed the district court's final order which
called for 75-88% of 6wheelchair seating to be provided with a view over
standing spectators."
110. Id.
111. Id. at 589.
112. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ACCESSIBLE STADIUMS 1 (1996).

113. PVA IV, 117 F.3d at 589. The full text of the settlement agreements for the Olympic
Stadium, Olympic Aquatic Center, and Olympic Tennis Center, respectively, can be found at
Untitled (visited July 12, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/stadiumo.htm>; Settlement
Agreement

Concerning the

Olympic

Aquatic

<http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/aquatic.htm>;
<http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/tennis.htm>.

Center

Untitled

(visited

(visited

July

12,

1999)

July

12,

1999)

114. PVA IV, 117 F.3d at 589.
115. Id.

116. Id. at 588-89; seealso United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1262, 1269 (D.
Minn. 1997) (stating that PVA IV opinion, including the substantial compliance rule, was
"persuasive and dispositive of the issues raised in this motion to dismiss regarding the lines of sight
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C. CasesRejecting DOJ's InterpretationRequiring
Lines of Sight Over Standing Spectators
1. District Court Case on the Rose Garden
The court in Independent Living Resources v. OregonArena Corp."7
rejected the D.C. Circuit's reasoning and held that DOJ's interpretation of
the regulation requiring sightlines over standing spectators was not entitled
to deference. Independent Living Resources concerned the Rose Garden,
a new arena being built for the NBA's Portland Trail Blazers and a minor
league hockey team. Independent Living Resources (ILR), a nonprofit
advocacy organization for the disabled, and a Portland attorney with a
disability sued the arena's builder and owner claiming a pattern of
discrimination due to the location of the wheelchair spaces and the lack of
sightlines over standing spectators."'
Like the district court in PVA III, the Independent Living Resources
court held that the arena violated Standard 4.33.3's dispersal requirement
by improperly "clustering" its wheelchair seating into the comers of the
end zones or a level of the arena which had originally been designated for
overflow press and standing room patrons." 9 Fully 82% of the Rose
Garden's wheelchair spaces were clustered in those locations and the court
said this "scheme [was] a far cry from exact or even rough proportionality"
required by the statute. 20 It also held that the arena violated the ADA
guidelines' "one percent plus one" regulation if the "excess" spaces in the

requirement").
117. 982 F. Supp. 698 (D. Or. 1997).
118. Id. at706.
119. Id.at 716-17.
120. Id. at 714. In reaching its decision on the dispersal issue, the court adopted DOJ's
interpretation ofStandard 4.33.3 which requires "both vertical and horizontal dispersal, i.e., in large
arenas and stadiums such as the Rose Garden the wheelchair locations must be distributed in a
manner that approximates the overall distribution of seats in the facility." Id. at 708. Oregon Arena
had argued that the Standard could be satisfied if there were "at least some wheelchair spaces in
each ticket price category." Id. at 709. The court disagreed, stating that "[w]ithout a requirement
for horizontal and vertical dispersal, an arena operator could simply designate a few token
wheelchair seats in the better seating areas, and cluster the majority of wheelchair seats in the last
row or in other undesirable locations." Id. It also noted that the "dispersal requirements ... could
be circumvented merely by adjusting ticket prices for specific groups of seats in the same manner
that electoral districts have long been subject to gerrymandering." Id. This tactic would likely be
challenged by wheelchair users and would lead to courts being "asked to decide the validity of the
ticket pricing plans for each basketball or hockey team in the nation[,]" and, thus "to intervene in
decisions that are better left in the hands of arena operators." Id. Accordingly, the court held that
in large arenas like the Rose Garden, "the wheelchair locations must be distributed in a manner that
roughly approximates the overall distribution of seats in the arena." Id.
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"overflow" level were subtracted.12
Unlike the PVA IV court, however, it refused to grant deference to the
DOJ interpretation of the standard to require sightlines over standing
spectators. Citing both PVA IV and the DOJ's interpretation,' ]LR had
argued that the arena was required to provide wheelchair users with a line
of sight over standing spectators."' The court divided this question into
three distinct issues: (1) whether DOJ could require that wheelchair users
be provided with a line of sight over standing spectators; (2) whether such
a requirement actually existed and whether it was binding upon Oregon
any equitable defenses to the
Arena; and (3) whether Oregon Arena
24 had
enforcement of such a requirement.1
a. DOJ's Interpretation of Standard 4.33.3 to Require Sightlines
Over Standing Spectator's Was Reasonable
The court answered the first question affirmatively, holding that it was
reasonable for DOJ to require sightlines over standing spectators. It
rejected Oregon Arena's argument that the enhanced line of sight
requirement constituted "preferential treatment" for wheelchair users
because some ambulatory spectators' views are similarly obstructed. " The
court noted that ambulatory spectators can stand with the rest of the crowd,
move around or angle their bodies to obtain a better view, or stand on their
chairs. Spectators in wheelchairs, however, usually do not have these
options, and the court said that "[w]hile some ambulatory spectators
occasionally have an obstructed view, that experience is the rule, rather
than the exception, for those who attend Rose Garden events in a
wheelchair."' 26 It also said that even assuming that the enhanced sightline
requirement would give wheelchair users a "slightly better sightline than
some ambulatory spectators, that is preferable to the alternative suggested
by defendant, which is to provide wheelchair users with sightlines that are
guaranteed to be the worst in the house. In no way can the latter be
construed as 'comparable' sightlines."' 27
Accordingly, the court held that ADA compliance may require
providing more than nominally "identical" facilities for customers with
disabilities. It stated that "[t]here is a difference between physically
identical facilities and functionally equivalent facilities," noting that if
121. Id. at 714.
122. The DOJ was an amicus party in this case. Id. at 706.
123. Id. at709.
124. Id. at 732-58.
125. Id. at 734.
126. Id. at 733.
127. Id.; see also PVA I1, 950 F. Supp. at 400 n.16 (rejecting "preferential treatment"
argument).
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public accommodations were only required to provide ambulatory patrons
and wheelchair users with physically identical facilities, "then there would
be no need to provide ramps and elevators; both groups would be given an
'equal opportunity' to use the stairs." '2 8 The objective of the ADA,
however, "is to provide persons with disabilities who utilize public
accommodations with an experience that is functionally equivalent to that
of other patrons, to the extent
feasible given the limitations imposed by
129
that person's disability."
Given this purpose, the court held that DOJ could have reasonably
concluded that providing wheelchair users with sightlines physically
identical to those of ambulatory spectators did not provide wheelchair
spectators with a functionally equivalent experience. "Such facilities may
be facially neutral but in practice have a disparate impact upon those in
wheelchairs." 3 ' Thus, it might be necessary to provide enhanced sightlines
so that wheelchair users could obtain a comparable benefit to that received
by ambulatory spectators. The court stated that while this might constitute
"preferential" treatment, "the class of wheelchair users is always open to
new members. However, the court has not observed-and does not
anticipate-a rush of volunteers choosing to have their legs amputated so
they may watch a basketball game from a wheelchair and thereby enjoy
'preferential' sightlines."'13 The court further reasoned that DOJ's
requiring enhanced sightlines was reasonable because "all of the efforts
that have been made to ensure accessible entrances, restrooms and
concession stands at the Rose Garden are of little consequence if
wheelchair users won't attend events at the Rose 32Garden because they
cannot see the event that they paid $65 to watch."'
b. The Sightline Requirement Was Not Enforceable Because It
Was a "Substantive" Rule Which Required Notice and
Comment Under the Administrative Procedure Act
Nonetheless, the court answered its second question-whether the 1994
TAM supplement was a valid "interpretive regulation"--in the negative.
Unlike the PVA IV court, it was unpersuaded by DOJ's argument that it
was not bound by the Access Board's commentary because, although DOJ
adopted the language of the ADAAG verbatim, it did not adopt the Access
Board's commentary discussing those guidelines. 3 3 It stated that the notice

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Independent Living Resources, 982 F. Supp. at 733.
Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.202, .203, .302).
Id. at 734.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 740.
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and comment provisions of the APA require administrative agencies
promulgating a legislative regulation to explain the proposed rule's
purpose and justification, respond to significant criticisms, and explain
34
why the agency decided to maintain or alter the proposed rule.
Accordingly, the court held that if DOJ did not adopt the Access Board's
commentary, then its own commentary on the accessibility guidelines had
to be sufficient to satisfy the APA's notice and comment requirements.
The court found that DOJ's commentary was insufficient. That
commentary discussed DOT's decision to adopt the ADAAG as a whole
instead of using established standards such as those from ANSI, but did not
respond to public comments on that issue. 135 It also contained a brief
136
summary of the guidelines that DOJ had copied from the Access Board,
but did not respond to public comments regarding individual Standards,
explain DOT's reasoning for adopting specific Standards, or state why it
rejected alternative language advocated in comments on the proposed
Standards. Instead, DOJ stated that the substantive comments regarding the
proposed Standards "have been addressed adequately in the final ADAAG.
the [Access] Board made numerous
Largely in response to comments,
137
proposal."'
its
from
changes
The court stated that the notice and comment rules did not "require [an]
agency to respond to every comment, or to [analyze] every issue or
alternative raised by comments.' 38 Still, it held that the separate
commentary published by DOJ was insufficient because it "[did] not
respond to any comments or analyze any issues or alternatives raised by
comments regarding specific standards. 139 It said that if DOJ did not
implicitly incorporate the Access Board's response to public comments
regarding individual Guidelines, then the agency had not responded to
those comments before adopting the Standards as binding regulations.
Moreover, the court held that DOJ-which in its notice to submit
comments to the Access Board rather than to DOJ-could not simply
disavow limiting interpretations and the other responses by the Access

134. Id. (citingGamboav. Rubin, 80F.3d 1338, 1346, vacatedon jurisdictionalgrounds, 101
F.3d 90 (9th Cir. 1996); Reytblatt v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 105 F.3d 715,722
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (requiring agency to respond to comments that raise significant problems in
reasoned manner); International Fabricare Inst. v. United States EPA, 972 F.2d 384,389 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (requiring agency "to give reasoned responses to all significant comments in a rulemaking
proceeding"); DAVIS & PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4 (3d ed. 1994 & Supp.
1996)).
135. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,585-86 (1991).
136. Id. at 35,586-35,589.
137. Id. at 35,587.
138. IndependentLiving Resources, 982 F. Supp. at 741 (quoting American Mining Congress
v. United States EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
139. Id.
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Board to those comments. It said that "[i]f the Access Board's commentary
was not binding upon DOJ, then that commentary and the entire notice and
comment procedure were largely an empty exercise."1 40 Instead, the court
concluded that DOJ had implicitly adopted the Access Board's response
to public comments regarding the proposed Guidelines when DOJ declared
that it would, and then did, adopt as its own accessibility standard the
made by the
Access Board's draft guidelines "with any amendment
141
[Access Board] during its rulemaking process."
c. The Term "Lines of Sight" Was Concerned
Only with the Dispersal Requirement
The IndependentLiving Resources court also concluded that the term
"lines of sight comparable to those for members of the general public" was
concerned only with the dispersal of wheelchair spaces and was not
referring to sightlines in relation to standing spectators. The PVA IV court
had rejected this argument, holding that the regulation already
accomplished the dispersal objective "by requiring facilities with over 300
seats to provide wheelchair seating 'in more than one location' and to give
wheelchair users a choice of admission prices,.., and therefore 'lines of
sight comparable' must have an added meaning-and the most obvious is
an unobstructed view."142 The Independent Living Resources court
disagreed, stating that "[i]f it were enough to provide wheelchair spaces in
'more than one location' and to give wheelchair users a 'choice of
admission prices,"' then Oregon Arena could locate virtually all of the
wheelchair spaces on the highest level of the Rose Garden "so long as it
provided a handful of spaces in at least one other location."' 14 3 It noted that
plaintiffs' principal complaint was that they were deprived of a choice of
sightlines at the Rose Garden because the wheelchair seating was largely
confined to the comers of the end zone. They contended that Oregon Arena
should also furnish wheelchair spaces with sightlines from behind the
basket, at mid-court, and in the front row for hockey. Thus, the court
concluded "it would not have been redundant for the Access Board to have
used the term 'lines of sight' to refer to the distribution of wheelchair
spaces."'"
In addition, the court noted that the Access Board expressly deferred its
decision on the sightlines over standing spectators question until a

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id. at 742.
117 F.3d at579, 583.
Independent Living Resources, 982 F. Supp. at 743 n.61.
Id.
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subsequent rulemaking. 45 Consequently, the court held that DOJ's
interpretation of Standard 4.33.3 in the 1994 TAM supplement "is an
attempt to impose a new substantive obligation, which may
not be
1 46
accomplished under the rubric of an 'interpretive regulation.'

145. Id. at 743 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 35,440 ("The issue of lines of sight over standing
spectators will be addressed in guidelines for recreational facilities.")).
146. Id. The court also held that the enhanced lines of sight standard could not be inferred
from the general non-discriminatory language ofthe ADA itself. Id.at 746. ILR and DOJ contended
that the Standards are exclusive only as to issues they specifically addressed, and courts must turn
to the general non-discrimination requirements of ADA if a design issue is not addressed in the
Standards. Id. at 745-46. The court disagreed, stating that the language and history of the ADA
implied that the standards are the exclusive source for design requirements. It said the plaintiffs'
position was problematic because it would allow anybody who was unhappy with the accessibility
of a new building to file suit alleging a design feature should have been included in the new
structure. The Independent Living Resources court said that "courts are ill-equipped to evaluate
such claims and to make what amount to engineering, architectural, and policy determinations as
to whether a particular design feature is feasible and desirable." Id. at 746. In addition, such an
approach would make it difficult to design a new arena or other structure because the design
requirements could be changed retroactively. Id.
Despite this ruling, the court went on to answer the third question-whether Oregon Arena had
an equitable defense to the enforcement of the enhanced sightlines requirement. Id. at 747. It stated
that it did so because the Ninth Circuit would need to decide whether Oregon Arena had any other
defenses if it disagreed with the district court's analysis that theTAM was not a valid interpretation
regulation and that a line of sight requirement could not be enforced directly under the ADA.
Therefore, in an effort to simplify matters for the appellate court and expedite an appeal, the district
court stated that if it had to specifically address the issue it would have found that there was no
equitable defense. Id. It noted that both Oregon Arena and, more so, its architects had been in
frequent contact with DOJ and were aware of its position on enhanced sightlines months before
ground was broken on the Rose Garden. Id. at 750-52. While Oregon Arena "[a]rguably... was
shooting at a moving target" because of the Access Board's statements on enhanced lines of sight,
it
didn't exactly go out of its way to comply with the ADA. Even assuming the
regulations did not expressly require enhanced sight lines, prudence would have
dictated that defendant provide them anyway. The consequences of being found
in non-compliance with the ADA are simply too great to take that risk. Instead,
defendant and its architect focused on doing the minimum that in their view was
legally required, rather than asking themselves how they could implement the
spirit of the ADA and make the facility accessible to persons with disabilities.
They chose to gamble on the narrower interpretation, and in the process bought
themselves a lawsuit.
Id. at 758.
Finally, the court held the "executive suites" at the Rose Garden were not in compliance with
the ADA. Id. at 764. In doing so, it first rejected Oregon Arena's argument that the suites were
exempt from the ADA because they were "private" and not "public accommodations." Id. at 759.
The court stated that while suites provide additional amenities and are partly enclosed, they are
merely "updated version[s] of the 'box seats' that have long been available at many ballparks ....
It is as if defendant had enclosed a group of twelve seats with a clear partition. These suites are part
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2. District Court Decision on the E-Centre
The court in Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music EntertainmentCentre
(CarusoI) 4 also held that DOJ had violated the APA by adopting a new
substantive obligation without the required notice and comments. The "ECentre," a music and entertainment facility in Camden, New Jersey, has an
interior pavilion with fixed seating for 6,200 patrons and an uncovered
lawn area where approximately 18,000 spectators can either stand or sit on
portable chairs or blankets. 4 Caruso, a disabled Vietnam War veteran who
uses a wheelchair because of his war-related injuries, and a non-profit
group known as Advocates for Disabled Americans alleged that the ECentre violated the ADA for two reasons: (1) it did not have enhanced
lines of sight for the disabled, and (2) the lawn area was not accessible to
wheelchair users. 49

of the arena, just like any other seat in the house." Id. And, "[a]lthough the general public may not
just stroll in and watch the game from the suites, that is true of any reserved seat in the building or,
for that matter, any box seat at Fenway Park." Id.
After determining the ADA applied, the court held that each of the suites had to be in
compliance with the ADA. Id. at 764. Oregon Arena had argued that the suites were analogous to
hotel rooms, and thus only a small percentage of them had to be accessible. The court disagreed,
noting that in a hotel the individual's main concern is getting a room for the night and she does not
care which room she is assigned to. Id.
By contrast, when a person with disabilities is invited to a gathering at a suite,
there is only one suite that counts: the one to which the guest has been invited. It
is no solace that there is a token accessible suite elsewhere in the building, or for
that matter if every other suite in the building is accessible.
Id. at 763. It also rejected Oregon Arena's argument that the suites complied with the ADA because,
although they were not ordinarily configured for wheelchair use, they could be modified if Oregon
Arena was given 48 hours notice. The court said this was unacceptable.
It always has been "possible" to improvise access, given advance notice that
someone with a wheelchair is coming. You simply had two strong persons
standing by to carry the wheelchair user up the stairs that could not be traversed
by a wheelchair. However, Congress has served notice through the ADA that such
solutions no longer are acceptable. In new construction, the facility must be
designed to be accessible from day one.
Id. at 764.
147. 968 F. Supp. 210 (D.N.J. 1997), affd, 174 F.3d 166 (3d Cir.), opinion vacated and
supersededon panel reh'g, 193 F.3d 730 (3d Cir. 1999).
148. Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entertainment Ctr. (Caruso II), 193 F.3d 730,731 (3d
Cir. 1999).
149. CarusoI, 968 F. Supp. at 212.
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a. The Sightline Requirement Was Not Enforceable Because It
Was a "Substantive" Rule Which Required Notice and
Comment Under the Administrative Procedure Act
The court held that the DOJ's interpretation requiring sightlines over
standing spectators was a new substantive rule and that it was
"inappropriate to hold defendants to a new standard that did not undergo
proper administrative rulemaking procedures."' 150 The court noted that the
Access Board had stated it would cover the enhanced lines of sight issue
"in a distinct, future regulation. If the Access Board did not intend for
section 4.33.3 to cover the issue, a DOJ TAM provision cannot be an
interpretation of that regulation."'1' It also noted that Congress used broad
language in the statute and had specifically required that the detailed
guidelines needed to implement the ADA should come from the Access
Board. Given this context, the court held that it was "inappropriate for the
DOJ to choose to adopt word-for-word the access Board
guidelines-guidelines which were subject to notice-and-comment and
then decide several years later to' add
new obligations that were specifically
52
omitted from those guidelines."'
b. The Language of the ADA Does Not Support the Lines of
Sight Over Standing Spectators Requirement
The CarusoI court also held that the language of the ADA alone could
not support the enhanced sightline standard. It stated that Congress's
delegation to the Access Board and DOJ showed that the public
accommodations provisions of ADA required a set of formal guidelines or
regulations. Indeed, in the event that DOJ failed to issue regulations in a
timely manner, Congress provided a "default" set that building owners
could safely follow. 153 Accordingly, the court held that "Congress did not

150. Id. at 215.
151. Id. (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 60,612, 60,618 (1992) (Notice of proposed Rulemaking)
(announcing that the Access Board would conduct further research and "address the issue of lines
of sight over standing spectators in the guidelines for recreational facilities" and seeking comments
on "design issues associated with providing.., a clear line of sight over standing spectators in
arenas, stadiums or other sports facilities"); 59 Fed. Reg. 31,676, 31,679 (1994) (Interim Final
Rule) (referring to the Access Board's "research project on assembly area accessibility" and
reiterating intention "to address issues associated with assembly areas in aseparate rulemaking once
this research is completed.")).
152. Id. at216.
153. Id. at 216-17. The court quoted 42 U.S.C. § 12186(d):
If final regulations have not been issued pursuant to this section, for new
construction or alterations for which a valid and appropriate State or local building
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intend for the ADA to be enforceable except through the adoption of a
detailed regulatory framework," and stated that "in the absence of an
applicable regulation, we cannot rely solely on the 'full and equal
enjoyment' statutory language to hold the defendants liable for building a
facility without enhanced sightlines."' 5 4
The court also rejected Caruso's argument that the DOJ's "comparable"
lines of sight regulation itself required the E-Centre to provide enhanced
lines of sight over standing spectators in front of them. The court noted that
the "comparable" lines of sight language in section 4.33.3 also appeared
in prior accessibility guidelines,"55 none of which were ever interpreted to
require enhanced lines of sight. The Access Board guidelines adopted the
standards used to draft these earlier guidelines,1 16 and the court held that
there was nothing in the ADA's legislative history suggesting that the
settled interpretation of "comparable" lines of sight language should be
replaced with a new interpretation. Moreover, DOJ did not express an
opinion on whether section 4.33.3 required enhanced lines of sight when
it chose to adopt the Access Board guidelines as its own regulations.' 57
permit is obtained prior to the issuance of final regulations under this section...
compliance with the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards in effect at the time
the building permit is issued shall suffice to satisfy the requirement that facilities
be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities as required under
section 12183 of this title... except that, if such final regulations have not been
issued one year after [the Board] issued the supplemental minimum guidelines
required under section 12204(a) of this title, compliance with such supplemental
minimum guidelines shall be necessary.
Id.
154. Id. at 217.
155. Id. (citing Minimum Guidelines and Requirements for Accessible Design (MGRAD), 47
Fed. Reg. 33,862 (Aug. 4, 1982) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 1190) (incorporating by reference
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard, A117.1-1986 § 4.31); Uniform Federal
Accessibility Standards (UFAS), 49 Fed. Reg. 31,528 (Aug. 7, 1984) (codified at 41 C.F.R. subpt.
101-19.6 App. A) (adopting ANSI Al 17.1-1980 § 4.33). ANSI is a private institution in New York
City, not connected with the federal government. The MGRAD were developed to implement §
502(b)(7) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 792, which prohibited discrimination
against people with disabilities by federal funds recipients, and were "intended to ensure that certain
buildings financed with Federal funds are designed, constructed, or altered so as to be readily
accessible to, and usable by, physically handicapped persons." 36 C.F.R. § 1190. 1. The UFAS were
developed pursuant to the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157, which
required government-owned buildings to be accessible. 41 C.F.R. subpt. 101-19.6 App. A. § 2.1.
156. Fed. Reg. 35,408 (1991) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt.1 191 App. A) (UFAS adopting ANSI
Al 17.1-1980 § 4.33).
157. Caruso I, 968 F. Supp. at 217. The court also rejected Caruso's argument that the ECentre was required to provide wheelchair seating in the lawn area. It noted that § 4.1.3(19)(a) of
the JDSAD governs the number of required wheelchair locations for "places of assembly with fixed
seating." Id. at 218. The lawn area did not have fixed seating, and therefore the court held it need
not be included when determining the E-Centre's seating capacity. Moreover, it stated:
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3. Third Circuit Decision on the E-Centre
a. Standard 4.33.3 Was Ambiguous on Whether the Term "Lines of
Sight" Was Concerned Only with the Dispersal Requirement
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in Caruso I,
again disagreeing with the PVA IVcourt. ' 8 In doing so, it first rejected the
argument that the "lines of sight comparable" language was not aimed
chiefly at requiring a dispersal of wheelchair seating throughout an arena.
The court noted that Standard 4.33.3 includes at least two
provisions- -- choice of admission prices" and "more than one location"
when "the seating capacity exceeds 300"-on the dispersal of wheelchair
locations and is entitled "Placement of Wheelchair Locations." 159 It said

that the attempt to "divorce" the 'lines of sight' requirement" from the two
provisions on dispersal "overlooks the possibility that the three provisions
are designed to work together" to ensure: "1) at a minimum, facilities with
over 300 seats provide at least two wheelchair locations and 2) larger
facilities provide wheelchair users with the option of choosing from among
seats that afford a variety of views for a variety of corresponding
prices."' 6 It said that "choice of admission prices" language alone did not
accomplish the second result because without the comparable lines of sight
language "a facility, regardless of its size and the number of views that it
offers to the general public, would be able to place all wheelchair users in
just two locations
so long as it offers some choice of prices in those
16 1
locations."
Accordingly, the court held that both the plaintiffs' reading (requiring
enhanced sightlines) and the E-Centre's reading (requiring only dispersal)
of the "lines of sight" language were "plausible and would provide some

The E-Centre provides the disabled with higher quality (i.e., closer) seats in the

pavilion for the same price as lawn seats. Plaintiffs do not offer any reasons why
the interior seats are not equivalent or superior to lawn seating. In our view, the
E-Centre provides equal, if not greater, access to its facility for wheelchair users
in the interior than it does for non-wheelchair users on the lawn.
Id.
158. Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entertainment Ctr. (Caruso II), 193 F.3d 730 (3d Cir.
1999). This opinion was issued after a panel rehearing and vacated and superseded an opinion
found at 174 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 1999).
159. Id. at 732.
160. Id. at 732-33.
161. Id. at 733 (citing Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp.
698, 743 n.61 (D. Or. 1997)).
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benefit to wheelchair users."' 62 Both were also consistent with the ADA's
goal of providing people with disabilities equal access to the benefits of
public accommodations,
and the court thus concluded that the language
63
was ambiguous.
b. The Sightline Requirement Was Not Enforceable Because It
Was a "Substantive" Rule Which Required Notice and
Comment Under the Administrative Procedure Act
Caruso argued that the court should grant deference to DOJ in resolving
this ambiguity,"6 while the E-Centre argued that DOJ's interpretation
created a new, substantive rule and, thus, it had to meet the APA's notice
and comment rule.165 The Third Circuit agreed with the E-Centre, rejecting
the D.C. Circuit's analysis in PVA IV. The PVA IV court had noted that in
promulgating its regulations DOJ "never referred to the [Access] Board's
concern, nor did it imply that its regulation did not address the problem of
lines of sight over standing spectators," and held that while "it is a
plausible inference that Justice, at the time, deliberately intended the
regulation to mean the same thing as did the Board- . . . it is not a
necessary inference."' 66 The Caruso I court disagreed, concluding that
"DOJ implicitly adopted the Access Board's analysis of 4.33.3. '167 It
supported this conclusion by noting that:
1) the DOJ referred all comments to the Board; 2) the DOJ
relied on the Board to make adequate changes based on those
comments; 3) the Board specifically changed the language of
4.33.3 in response to comments and explained that change in
its commentary; 4) the DOJ was a "member of the Board" and
"participated actively... in preparation of both the proposed
and final versions of the [guidelines]," 28 C.F.R. Part 36,
App. B, at 632; and 5) the DOJ's commentary stated that the
final guidelines promulgated by the Board adequately

162. Id.
163. Id. at 733.
164. Id. (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504,512 (1994) (explaining that
an agency's interpretation of its own regulation "must be given controlling weight unless it is
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation") (internal quotations omitted); Menkowitz
v. Pottstown Mem'l Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 113, 123 (3d Cir. 1998) (DOJ Technical Assistance
Manual entitled to deference)).
165. Id. at 733,736 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) & (c) (notice and comment procedure required
for substantive rules but not interpretive rules); Dia Navigation Co. v. Pomeroy, 34 F.3d 1255, 1264
(3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that a rule is substantive if "the agency intends to create a new law.
rights, or duties")).
166. Id. (quoting PVA IV, 117 F.3d at 587).
167. Id.
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168
addressed all comments.

The court then held that Standard 4.33.3 "does not reach the issue of
sightlines over standing spectators.' ' 169 It stated that courts need not grant
deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation if "an
alternative reading is compelled by... indications of the [agency's] intent
at the time of the regulation's promulgation."'"7 "An agency is not allowed
to change a legislative rule retroactively through the process of
disingenuous interpretation of the rule to mean something other than its
original meaning." '
D. Discussion: The TechnicalAssistance Manual'sLines of Sight Over
Standing SpectatorsRequirement Should Be Given Judicial
Deference and There Should Be a Rebuttable Presumption
thatAll Wheelchair Seats Should Be in Compliance
1. Judicial Deference Should Be Given to DOJ's
Interpretation of Standard 4.33.3
a. Deference Is Given to an Administrative Agency's
Reasonable Interpretation of Its Own Regulations
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council,17 2 the
Court held that when Congress delegates the authority to interpret a statute
through regulations to an administrative agency, courts should defer to the
agency's regulatory interpretations "unless they are arbitrary, capricious,

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 736-37 (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)).
171. Id. at 737 (quoting I KENNETHC. DAVIS &RICHARDJ. PIERCE,JR.,ADMINISTRATIVELAW
TREATISE § 6.10, at 283 (1994)). The Third Circuit did reverse the district court's holding that the
E-Centre did not have to make the lawn area accessible to wheelchair users. Id. at 739. Specifically,
it rejected the argument that it was acceptable to restrict wheelchair users from the lawn area
because the E-Centre provided "higher quality (i.e., closer) seats in the pavilion." Id. at 740. The
court said this contention was inconsistent with the ADA's plain language that "[n]otwithstanding
the existence of separate or different programs or activities... an individual with a disability shall
not be denied the opportunity to participate in such programs or activities that are not separate or
different." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(C). It concluded that the E-Centre could onlyjustify the failure
to provide access to the lawn area if it showed structural impracticability under 42 U.S.C. §
12183(a)(1). The E-Centre did not make such a showing, and the court reversed and remanded the
district court's grant of summary judgment on the lawn-access claim for further proceedings.
CarusoII, 193 F.3d at 740.
172. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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or manifestly contrary to the statute." 7 ' Courts may not substitute their
own interpretation of a statutory provision if an administrative agency's
interpretation is reasonable. 74
A similar rule granting deference to an administrative agency's
interpretation of its own regulations was announced in Bowles v. Seminole
Rock & SandCo. 75 Courts will defer to the agency's interpretation "unless
it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." 176 As with the
Chevron rule, deference is granted
as long as the agency's interpretation of
77
the regulation is reasonable.
The primary policy behind the Seminole Rock rule is that courts should
respect Congress's delegation of lawmaking power to the agency. 78 The
agency's policymaking expertise 179 and authorship of the regulation are
also cited as reasons for Seminole Rock's rule of deference, but the
adoption of a regulation from another agency does not lessen the deference
granted to the agency's interpretation.8 0 As the PVA IV noted:

173. Id. at 844.
174. Id.
175. 325 U.S. 410,414 (1945).
176. Id.; see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,461 (1997) (quoting Seminole Rock rule);
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504,512 (1994) (same); Stinson v. United States, 508
U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (same); United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977) (same).
177. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 94-95 (1995) ("It is a reasonable
regulatory interpretation, and we must defer to it."); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S.
680,702 (1991) ("[t]he Secretary's view need be only reasonable to warrant deference"); Martin
v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 150 (1991) ("Et]he reviewing
court should give effect to the agency's interpretation so long as it is 'reasonable').
178. Pauley, 501 U.S. at 698 (stating "[firom this congressional delegation derives the
Secretary's entitlement to judicial deference"); Martin,499 U.S. at 151 (stating "we presume that
the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the agency's delegated
lawmaking powers"); see also John F. Manning, ConstitutionalStructureand JudicialDeference
to Agency InterpretationsofAgency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 629 (1996) (citing political
accountability as a rationale for Seminole Rock deference). Professor Manning ultimately argued,
however, that constitutional separation of powers concerns militate in favor of a lesser standard of
judicial deference. Id. at 680-81.
179. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512 (stating "[B]road deference is all the more
warranted when, as here, the regulation concerns 'a complex and highly technical regulatory
program,' which requires "'significant expertise and entail[s] the exercise ofjudgment grounded
in policy concerns.") (quoting Pauley, 501 U.S. at 697)); Martin, 499 U.S. at 151 (stating "applying an agency's regulation to complex or changing circumstances calls upon the agency's unique
expertise and-policymaldng prerogatives"); see also Manning, supra note 178, at 629-30 ("[Ihe
relative expertise of agencies and courts favors the availability of binding judicial deference to agency
interpretations of regulations.").
180. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91,109-14 (1992) (deferringto the EPA's interpretation
of regulations that incorporated Oklahoma's standards); Pauley,501 U.S. at 698 (deferring to the
Secretary of Labor's interpretation of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's
regulations); see also Manning, supra note 178, at 630 n. 104 (stating that "[a]uthorship is not an
essential predicate to deference under Seminole Rock").
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We do not defer . . . to an administrative agency's

interpretation of its regulation solely because its employees
are the drafters and presumably have superior knowledge as
to what they intended. .

.

. [T]he doctrine of deference is

based primarily on the agency's statutory role as the sponsor
of the regulation, not necessarily on its drafting expertise.' 8 '
Accordingly, courts should apply Seminole Rock deference to DOJ's
interpretation of Standard 4.33.3 even though the standard was drafted by
the Access Board.
b. The Sightlines Over Standing Spectators Requirement
Is a Reasonable Interpretation of Standard 4.33.3
Under the Seminole Rock rule, courts must defer to an agency's
interpretation of a regulation if it is reasonable. Courts have held that an
interpretation is reasonable where it is consistent with the regulation's
text 1'82 and the purpose of the governing statute. 8 3 DOJ's interpretation of
Standard 4.33.3 requiring lines of sight over standing spectators satisfies
both criteria: it is consistent with both the text of Standard 4.33.3 and the
purpose of the ADA.
Standard 4.33.3 states that wheelchair seating must have "lines of sight

181. PVA IV, 117 F.3d at 585 (citing Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 110, 112 (1992);
American Train Dispatchers Ass'n v. ICC, 54 F.3d 842, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
182. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 518 (deferring to agency's interpretation because
it was "faithful to the regulation's plain language"); Valkering, U.S.A., Inc. v. United States Dep't
of Agric., 48 F.3d 305, 307 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that "[w]e must accept an agency's
interpretation of its own regulations, 'if it is reasonable in terms of the words of the regulation"
(quoting Baker v.Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1149 (8th Cir. 1984)); Visiting Nurse Ass'n of N. Shore,
Inc. v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 1002 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that courts must defer to an agency's
interpretation "if it is based on a permissible construction of the statute"); Marymount Hosp., Inc.
v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 658, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that courts must defer to an agency's
interpretation if it "is within the range of reasonable meanings that the words of the regulation
admit").
183. United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 873 (1977) (invalidating regulation, as
interpreted by the Department of Defense, because it was found to be "contrary to the manifest
purposes of Congress"); Lodi Community Hosp. v. Shalala, 94 F.3d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1997)
("Agency regulations must be consistent with and in furtherance of the purposes and policies
embodied in the Congressional statute which authorize them.") (quoting Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Shalala, 82 F.3d 291,294 (9th Cir. 1996)); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA,
25 F.3d 1063, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that, "[H]owever reasonable the agency's
interpretation of its regulations, we must not give those regulations effect if they conflict with the
governing statute."); Valkering, 48 F.3d at 307 (stating that, "We must accept an agency's
interpretation of its own regulations, 'if it is reasonable in terms of... the purposes of the statute."'
(quoting Baker, 730 F.2d at 1149)).
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comparable to those for members of the general public."' 8 4 The key word
is "comparable" and the reasonableness of DOJ's interpretation depends
on the line of sight enjoyed by ambulatory spectators. When the people in
front of an ambulatory spectator stand and block his view, he can recover
his line of sight by standing as well. 5 Wheelchair users, however, cannot
stand and when the spectators in front of them stand "their view of the
event is substantially or entirely obstructed. Instead of seeing the concert,
or the goal or winning basket, patrons seated in wheelchairs... typically
' 86
can see only the backs (or backsides) of those standing in front of them."'
The "comparability" of wheelchair seating to that of the general public,
therefore involves a choice of "requiring the superior, enhanced views or
accepting the completely eclipsing, unenhanced views."' 87

184. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A § 4.33.3 (1994).
185. PVA III, 950 F. Supp. at 400 n. 16 (finding that an ambulatory spectator can regain 90%
of his view by standing); Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698,
733 (D. Or. 1997) (finding that "ambulatory spectators have the option of standing with the rest of
the crowd and can thereby recapture most of the lost view").
186. Independent Living Resources, 982 F. Supp. at 732-33; see also PVA 111, 950 F. Supp.
at 400 n.16 (wheelchair users "will be afforded nearly no visibility" when spectators stand).
187. PVA III, 950 F. Supp. at400 n.16. Defendants have argued in a number of cases that the
phrase "lines of sight comparable to those for members of the general public," means only that
wheelchair seating areas should be dispersed so that wheelchair users have a choice of different
geographical locations within a facility. Id. The PVA IV court, however, held that the regulation
already accomplished the dispersal objective by requiring facilities with over 300 seats to provide
wheelchair seating "in more than one location" and to give wheelchair users a choice of admission
prices.... [Therefore,] "lines of sight comparable" must have an added meaning, "and the most
obvious is an unobstructed view." 117 F.3d at 583. It further stated that "the language 'lines of sight
comparable' quite naturally is interpreted to refer to the ability of a wheelchair user to see a
performance without any obstruction." Id.
The court in Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2000), reached a similar
conclusion in rejecting a theater company's argument that Standard 4.33.3 only applies to theaters
with a capacity of over 300 seats. Emphasizing the phrase "choice of admission prices and lines of
sight comparable to," Cinemark argued that the regulation simply imposes a dispersal requirement
and requires larger venues to provide a variety of viewing locations and admission prices for
wheelchair-users. Id. at 786-87 (quoting Standard 4.33). It explained that simply requiring a"choice
of admissions prices" would not accomplish the dispersal goal because some larger venues such as
college sports stadia only charge a single admission price. Cinemark contended that because
theaters with seating capacities under 300 are explicitly permitted to provide wheelchair seating in
a single area they are exempt from the dispersal requirement, and, thus, the entire regulation. Id. at
787.
The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that the "lines of sight" language demands more than mere
dispersal. Id. (citing Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143-45 (1995) (a regulation must be
interpreted as a whole, "with the assumption that the Department intended each of the regulation's
terms to convey meaning")). First, it found that the "lines of sight" language "is entirely divorced
from the dispersal requirement. The provision requiring multiple seating locations comes at the end
of the regulation and does not in any way modify the earlier requirements." Id.
"Second, the phrase 'choice of' modifies only 'admissions prices' and not 'lines of sight."' Id.
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The court noted that "comparable choice of admission prices" and "comparable lines of sight" had
been consistently treated as two separate requirements. Id. (citing ADAAG, 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App.
B, at 650 (1999) ("the final rule adds... a requirement that... wheelchair seating provide lines
of sight and choice of admission prices comparable to those for the general public"); UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENTOFJUSTICE, THEAMERICANS wrrH DISABIriES AcrTTcHNCALASSISTANCE
MANUAL § 111-7.5180 (Supp. 1994) ("in addition to requiring . .. dispersion of wheelchair

locations, ADAAG requires that wheelchair locations provide people with disabilities lines of sight
comparable to those for members of the general public")).
Third, the court criticized Cinemark's interpretation because it "effectively reads out the
opening clause of the 'lines of sight' portion of section 4.33.3" which states that "wheelchairs shall
be an integral part of any fixed seating plan and shall be provided so as to provide people with
physical disabilities with a choice of... lines of sight comparable to those for members of the
general public. Id. (quoting Standard 4.33.3). Finally, the court stated that applying section 4.33.3
only where seating capacity exceeds 300 would permit smaller theaters to avoid all of its placement
criteria, including the one requiring that wheelchair seating "adjoin an accessible route that also
serves as a means of egress in case of emergency." Id. (quoting Standard 4.33.3). This would go
against the purpose of both the regulation and the ADA, and accordingly, the court concluded
Standard 4.33.3 "imposes two independent requirements: 1) that theaters with over three-hundred
seats provide wheelchair spaces in more than one location, and 2) that smaller facilities provide
people with physical disabilities with lines of sight and choice of ticket prices comparable to those
enjoyed by the general public." Id. at 787-88.
The court also found that, although the phrase "lines of sight" lacked a clear meaning in the
ADA context at the time DOJ adopted Standard 4.33.3, the phrase meant "unobstructed view" in
several other contexts. Id. at 788-89 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.685 (2000) (FCC regulation requiring
that antennae have line of sight, without obstruction, of the communities that they serve); 46 C.F.R.
§ 13.103 (2000) (defining direct supervision as having line of sight of the person being supervised);
36 C.F.R. § 2.18 (2000) (forbidding people under the age of 16 from operating snowmobiles unless
the are "within line of sight" of a responsible person over age 21)).
The Independent Living Resources court, however, concluded that the term "lines of sight
comparable to those for members of the general public" was concerned with the dispersal of
wheelchair spaces and was not referring to sightlines in relation to standing spectators. 982 F. Supp.
at 743 n.61. It stated that "[i]f it were enough to provide wheelchair spaces in 'more than one
location' and to give wheelchair users a 'choice of admission prices,"' then Oregon Arena could
locate virtually all of the wheelchair spaces on the highest level of the Rose Garden "so long as it
provided a handful a handful of spaces in at least one other location." Ii. It noted that plaintiffs'
principal complaint was that they were deprived of a choice of sightlines at the Rose Garden
because the wheelchair seating was largely confined to the comers of the end zone. Id. Thus, the
court concluded "it would not have been redundant for the Access Board to have used the term
'lines of sight' to refer to the distribution of wheelchair spaces." Id.
Similarly, the Caruso HI court said that without the comparable lines of sight language "a
facility, regardless of its size and the number of views that it offers to the general public, would be
able to place all wheelchair users in just two locations so long as it offers some choice of prices in
those locations." 193 F.3d at 733. Accordingly, the court held that both the plaintiffs' reading
(requiring enhanced sightlines) and the E-Centre's reading (requiring only dispersal) of the "lines
of sight" language were "plausible and would provide some benefit to wheelchair users." Id. Both
were also consistent with the ADA's goal of providing people with disabilities equal access to the
benefits of public accommodations, and the court thus concluded that the language was ambiguous.
Id.
What both the IndependentLiving Resources and CarusoII courts ignored in stating that "lines
of sight" could concern only dispersal, however, is the Access Board commentary on that language.
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A complete view is obviously more comparable to ambulatory
spectators' view than is no view, and requiring wheelchair seating to have
lines of sight over standing spectators is a reasonable interpretation of
Standard 4.33.3.188 Accordingly, DOJ's interpretation of Standard 4.33.3
is consistent with the text and is entitled to deference under the Seminole
Rock standard.
The DOJ interpretation is also consistent with the purpose of the
statute. The ADA was intended "to bring persons with disabilities into the
economic and social mainstream of American life."1 89 Sporting events are
unquestionably an important part of mainstream American society, and
Congress was repeatedly told that wheelchair users did not attend them
because of accessibility problems."9 More specifically, wheelchair users
are unlikely to attend sporting events if they cannot see the most important
parts of the game.19 1 And, as the Independent Living Center court noted:
"all of the efforts that have been made to ensure accessible entrances,

That commentary indicated that the Board contemplated that "lines of sight" could refer to the
ability of spectators to actually see the game. The Board was concerned that the language "may not
suffice in sports arenas or race tracks where the audience frequently stands" and solicited comments
on "whether full lines of sight over standing spectators... should be required." 56 Fed. Reg. 2296,
2314 (1991) (emphasis added). This commentary shows that Board thought "lines of sight
comparable" did have an added meaning beyond dispersal--there would be no need for concern
about standing spectators if the language was solely focused on dispersal. The "most obvious
[added meaning] is an unobstructed view." PVA IV, 117 F.3d at 583. This conclusion is supported
by the clear meaning or that phrase in other regulatory contexts. See Lara, 207 F.3d 788-89.
188. See IndependentLivingResources, 982 F. Supp. at 733 ("Even assuming that wheelchairs
[sic] users would enjoy a slightly better sightline than some ambulatory spectators, that is preferable
to the alternative suggested by [the] defendant, which is to provide wheelchair users with sightlines
that are guaranteed to be the worst in the house. In no way can the latter be construed as
'comparable' sightlines.").
189. S.REP. No. 101-116, at 58 (1989); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 23 (1990).
190. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PUBuC LAW 101-336, 108-09 (Committee Print, Vol. I), availableon
Westlaw as A&P ADA COMM. PRINT 1990 (28A) ("The large majority ofpeople with disabilities
do not go to movies, do not go to the theater, do not go to see musical performances, and do not go
to sports events." (quoting National Council on Disability summary of the findings of a recent Lou
Harris poll)); id. at 943 ("When people don't see the disabled among our co-workers, or on the bus,
or at the sports field, or in a movie theater, most Americans think it's because they can't. It's time
to break this myth. The real reason people don't see the disabled among their co-workers, or on the
bus, or at the sports field, or in a movie theater is because of barriers and discrimination. Nothing
more.") (quoting statement of Jo Holzer, Executive Director, Council for Disability Rights); id. at
2155 ("Two-thirds of all disabled persons never went to a sports event in the past year, compared
to 50% of all adults." (citing 1986 Harris Survey of Americans with Disabilities)).
191. Maryann Haggerty, Pollin Sued Over Design of MCI Center; Setup Will Leave
Wheelchair Users with Impeded View, GroupSays, WASH. POST, June 15,1996, at Cl (quoting the
deputy executive director of the Paralyzed Veterans of America: '"The bottom line here is if you
can't see the game, you might as well stay home and watch it on TV, and that's the message we're
getting from the MCI Center.").
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restrooms, and concession stands at the Rose Garden are of little
consequence if wheelchair users won't attend events at the Rose Garden
because they cannot see the event that they paid $65 to watch." 1"
Accordingly, requiring wheelchair seating to have sightlines over standing
spectators furthers Congress's goal of integrating the disabled into society
by allowing wheelchair users to enjoy sporting events in the same way as
the able-bodied. Therefore, DOJ's interpretation of Standard 4.33.3 is
consistent with the ADA's intent and is entitled to judicial deference.
2. The Sightlines Requirement Is an "Interpretive" Rule
Exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act
Under the APA there is no notice and comment requirement for
"interpretive rules" as opposed to "substantive rules." 193 As the PVA IV
court noted, however, it is often difficult to draw the line between
interpretive rules and substantive rules.1 94 One formulation states that the
distinction is that an interpretive rule "'simply states what the
administrative agency thinks the statute means, and only reminds affected
parties of existing duties,' whereas a legislative rule 'intends to create new
law, rights, or duties."' 1 95 This description of the characteristics is much
more easily stated than applied, however,'96 and "[t]he distinction between
an interpretive rule and a legislative rule is fuzzy at best." 197

192. Independent Living Resources, 982 F. Supp. at 734.
193. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1994).
194. PVA IV,117 F.3d at 583.
195. Id. (quoting GeneralMotors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561,1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(en banc)).
196. Id. (citing Robert A. Anthony, "Interpretive" Rules, "Legislative" Rules, and "Spurious"
Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, n.10 & nn.13-14 (1994) (citing cases bemoaning
difficulty of applying distinction)). Another formulation is that interpretive rules are statements
"issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency's construction of the... rules which it
administers," Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995), and "merely clarify or
explain existing... regulations." Federal Labor Relations Auth. v. United States Dep't of the Navy,
966 F.2d 747, 762 n.14 (3d Cir. 1992). A rule is not substantive merely because it "may have
substantial impact." American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037,1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing
American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548,560 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
Substantive rules "grant rights, impose obligations, or produce other significant effects on private
interests." Id. at 1045 (quoting Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694,701-02 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). The
D.C. Circuit has also stated that a rule is legislative if it has "legal effect." American Mining
Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The court said
that a rule has legal effect if: (1) in the absence of the rule, no legislative basis would exist for an
enforcement action; (2) "the agency has published the rule in the Code of Federal Regulations;" (3)
the agency "explicitly invoked its general legislative authority" to pass the rule; or (4) "the rule
effectively amends a prior legislative rule." Id. at 1112.
197. Interport, Inc. v. Magaw, 135 F.3d 826, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing American Hosp.
Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045-46 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). The term "substantive" is sometimes
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Even given this "fuzzy" test, however, the 1994 TAM can be classified
as an interpretive rule because it merely explains the term "lines of sight
comparable" which is not defined in Standard 4.33.3. In holding that the
1994 TAM supplement was an interpretive rule, the PVA V court said that
the decisive factor was "how tightly the agency's interpretation is drawn
linguistically from the actual language of the statute or rule."' 98 It stated
that the sightlines over standing spectators interpretation was "driven by
the actual meaning [DOJ] ascribes to the phrase 'lines of sight
comparable'-the 'legal base upon which the rule rests. '""99 Accordingly,
it held that "the [TAM] interpretation is not sufficiently distinct or additive
to the regulation to require notice and comment. ' 2°
The TAM requirement of sightlines over standing spectators is also an
interpretive rule under another, more straightforward test: "in order for
notice and comment to be necessary, 'the [later] rule would have to be
inconsistent with another rule having the force of law, notjust any agency
interpretation regardless of whether it had been codified. ' 20' Moreover,
notice and comment are not required just because an agency changes its
policy or interpretation. 2

used as a synonym for "legislative." Metropolitan Sch. Dist. v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485,488 (7th Cir.
192). For a general discussion of this issue, see Elizabeth Williams, Annot., What Constitutes
"Interpretive Rule" of Agency so as to Exempt Such Action from Notice Requirements of
Administrative ProcedureAct (5 U.S.C.A. § 553(B)(3)(A)), 126 A.L.R. FED. 347 (1995).
198. 117 F.3d at 588.
199. Id. (quoting United Techs. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714,719-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
200. Id.
201. Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73,81 (lstCir. 1998) (quoting Chief Probation Officers v.
Shalala, 118 F.3d 1327, 1337 (9th Cir. 1997) (White, J. (retired, sitting by designation)). The
Warder court said that the Supreme Court "intimated this much" in Shalalav. Guernsey Mem'l
Hosp., 514 U.S. 87 (1995). Guernsey involved a challenge to the validity of an accounting
provision in the Health Care Finance Administration's Provider Reimbursement Manual (PRM).
PRM § 233 was adopted without notice and comment and departed from Generally Accepted
Accounting Practices (GAAP). Id. at 97. The hospital argued that PRM § 233 was not a valid
interpretive rule and could not be since it was inconsistent with existing regulations requiring
application of GAAP. Id. The Court disagreed, stating that the PRM provision concerned "[t]he
only question unaddressed by the otherwise comprehensive regulations on this particular subject."
Id. It held that the measure "[was] a prototypical example of an interpretive rule" because the PRM
provision merely applied existing law." Id. at 99. Hence, this was not "inconsistentwith any of the
Secretary'sexisting regulations."Id. at 99-100 (emphasis supplied).
202. Chief ProbationOfficers, 118 F.3d at 1337; see also Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala.
512 U.S. 504, 517-18 (1994) (Secretary not estopped from changing legal interpretation that she
believes to be erroneous); Orengo Caraballo v. Reich, 1IF.3d 186, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[olnly
where a second rule repudiates or is irreconcilable with [a prior legislative rule]," must "the second
rule ... be an amendment of the first[,] and [therefore] itself must be legislative" (internal
quotations omitted; first two sets of brackets in original)); White v. Shaala, 7 F.3d 296, 304 (2d
Cir. 1993) ("If the rule is an interpretation of a statute rather than an extra-statutory imposition of
rights, duties, or obligations, it remains interpretive even if the rule embodies the Secretary's
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Courts holding that the 1994 TAM supplement was a substantive rule
did so based on the Access Board's comment that "[t]he issue of lines of
sight over standing spectators will be addressed in guidelines for
recreational facilities.'2u3 These courts held that the 1994 TAM supplement
created a new substantive obligation2° because, while DOJ never explicitly
adopted the
Access Board's commentary on Standard 4.33.3, it did so
25
implicitly.
Even if this is true, however, the TAM requirement of sightlines over
standing spectators did not require notice and comment because it was not
"inconsistent with another rule having the force of law. ' '2°6 Neither the
Access Board's guidelines or its commentary have the force of law. Indeed,
as the PVA IV court noted, Congress never mandated that DOJ follow the
Board's guidelines. It only required that the "[s]tandards included in
regulations issued under [the facility provisions of Title 1111] shall be
consistent with the minimum guidelines and requirements issued by the...
Board."' Congress gave DOJ the ultimate authority for enforcing the
ADA and "[o]nce the Board's language was put out by the Department as
its own regulation, it became, as the statute contemplates, the Justice
Department's and only the Justice Department's responsibility." 208
The 1994 TAM supplement merely clarifies and explains DOJ's
interpretation of one of those regulations: Standard 4.33.3. Accordingly,
it should be classified as an interpretive rule and is exempt from the APA' s
changed interpretation of the statute."); Metropolitan School Dist. v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 492
(7th Cir. 1992) ("an agency's change in its reading of the statute does not necessarily make the rule
announcing the change legislative"); Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1986)
(Environmental Protection Agency revised its prior definition of the statutory words "reasonable
available control technology;" the court held that the revision was interpretive and, hence, not
subject to notice and comment).
203. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,408, 35,440 (1991).
204. Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 743 (D. Or.
1997) ("the 1994 TAM supplement is an attempt to impose a new substantive obligation"); Caruso
v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entertainment Ctr. (Caruso I), 968 F. Supp. 210, 215 (D.N.J. 1997)
(stating that the 1994 TAM supplement "is a new substantive rule" that "creates a new set of
obligations"); Caruso v. Blockbuster-SonyMusicEntertainment Ctr. (Caruso II), 193 F.3d 733 (3d
Cir. 1999) (stating that Standard 4.33.3 "does not reach the issue of sightlines over standing
spectators").
205. Independent Living Resources, 982 F. Supp. at 740-42 (finding that DOJ implicitly
adopted the Access Board's commentary because, by itself, DOJ's commentary did not satisfy the
APA); Caruso 11, 193 F.3d at 736 ("DOJ implicitly adopted the Access Board's analysis of
4.33.3."). While the court in CarusoIdid not use the term "implicit adoption," it clearly imputed
the Access Board's commentary to DOJ. 968 F. Supp. at 215-16.
206. Warder, 149 F.3d at 81.
207. PVA IV, 117 F.3d at 587 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12186(c)).
208. Id. at 585; see also PVA II, 950 F. Supp. at 391 (stating that "[Tihe Board is not the
authoritative agency on this matter. Under the ADA, the Board is merely given the role of setting
minimum guidelines for the Attorney General's regulations to follow.").
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notice and comment requirement.2 "9
3. Requiring Only "Substantial Compliance" with the Sightlines
Over Standing Spectators Rule Is Inconsistent
with the ADA's Language and Intent
In the PVA case both the district court and the D.C. Circuit held that the
MCI Center need only be in "substantial compliance" with this interpretive
rule.210 The courts held that this was achieved if a substantial number (7588%) of wheelchair seats provided lines of sight over standing
spectators .211 DOJ objected to this substantial compliance rule, arguing that
there should be a rebuttable presumption that all wheelchair seats should
have sightlines over standing spectators unless: (1) it is structurally
impracticable to do so, or (2) ambulatory spectators also do not have lines
of sight over standing spectators.212 The D.C. Circuit rejected this
argument, stating that it was not clear whether DOJ could further add to the
interpretation found in the TAM during litigation "and get deference to that
marginally additional interpretation."2 " It also rejected the argument that
the substantial compliance standard would "encourage disuniformity of
interpretation of the regulation," stating that it overlooked DOJ's authority
2 14
to clarify its position by putting out an amendment to the manual.
What the PVA IV court apparently overlooked, however, is the impact
requiring only "substantial compliance" will have on the wheelchair users
who buy the seats which do not comply with the sightlines requirement.
The ADA states that "no individual" shall be discriminated against in the
"fulland equal enjoyment' of the goods and services offered by places of
public accommodation. 1 5 Stadiums and arenas are public
accommodations216 and the good or service they provide is a view of games

209. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. West, 138 F.3d 1434, 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ('"Interpretive
rules' ... clarify or explain existing law or regulations and are exempt from notice and comment
under section 553(b)(A)."); Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm'n v. O'Leary,
93 F.3d 103, 112 (3d Cir. 1996); Clarry v. United States, 85 F.3d 1041, 1048 (2d Cir. 1996).
210. PVA III, 950 F. Supp. at 401; PVA IV, 117 F.3d at 588-89.
211. PVA IV, 117 F.3d at 588-89.
212. Id. at 589. DOJ took a similar position when the Access Board informally circulated a
draft of a proposed amendment to ADAAG 4.33.3 in March 1994 which would have required that
only 70% of wheelchair seats have sightlines over standing spectators. After DOJ responded that
the figure should be 100%, the Board's executive director wrote the assistant attorney general in
charge of DOJ's Civil Rights Division saying that the Board had not yet adopted the 70%
requirement and would consult with DOJ in drafting the final rule. Independent Living Resources,
982 F. Supp. at 744.
213. PVA IV, 117 F.3d at 589.
214. Id.
215. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
216. Id. § 12181(7)(C).
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and other events. "A wheelchair user who cannot see the most exciting
parts of a game (that is, the parts during which people stand) does not
experience 'full and equal enjoyment,' as compared to the fans who can
see the entire game."21 7 Accordingly, the substantial compliance rule is
inconsistent with the plain language of the ADA: allowing designs in
which only a "substantial percentage" of wheelchair locations have
sightlines over standing spectators necessarily means that some wheelchair
users who buy tickets will be unable to see the most exciting parts of a
game. More specifically, by requiring that only 75-88% of wheelchair seats
at the MCI Center have sightlines over standing spectators, the PVA IV
decision guaranteed that 12-25% of wheelchair users who buy tickets will
have less than "full and equal enjoyment" of the game because standing
spectators will block their view.
Indeed, other courts have recognized that, in some circumstances,
failing to bring all of a public accommodation into compliance is an
inadequate remedy. For example, the IndependentLiving Resources court
held that all of the "executive suites" at the Rose Garden had to be in
compliance with the ADA. Oregon Arena had argued that the suites were
analogous to hotel rooms, and thus only a small percentage of them had to
be accessible. The court disagreed. It noted that in a hotel, the individual's
main concern is getting a room for the night and she does not care which
room she is assigned to.
By contrast, when a person with disabilities is invited to a
gathering at a suite, there is only one suite that counts: the
one to which the guest has been invited. It is no solace that
there is a token accessible suite elsewhere in the building, or
for that matter if every other suite in the building is
accessible.1 8
The court in Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc.219 reached a similar
conclusion in rejecting a theater company's argument that it could come
into compliance with the ADA by retrofitting only five out of eighteen

217. Fritts, supra note 37, at 2673 (citing Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena
Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 733 (D. Or. 1997) (stating that wheelchair seats that do not provide
sightlines over standing spectators are "guaranteed to be the worst in the house" (emphasis
added))). Fritts argued that the D.C. Circuit erred in adopting the substantial compliance rule
instead of the rebuttable presumption rule proposed by DOJ in its amicus brief because courts
should grant some deference to "an agency's interpretation of its interpretation of its regulation,"
and because "the rebuttable presumption rule is more reasonable than the substantial compliance
rule." Id. at 2669.
218. Independent Living Resources, 982 F. Supp. at 763 (emphasis added).
219. No. EP-97-CA-502-H, 1999 WL 305108 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 1999), rev'd on other
grounds, 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2000).
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theater auditoriums which the court had found violated Standard 4.33.3.
Lara and other wheelchair users had alleged that the "stadium style"
seating featured in eighteen out of twenty movie theaters at a new
multiplex violated Standard 4.33.3's "comparable lines of sight"
requirement. Unlike the traditional "incline" type theater, a "stadium style"
theater has a series of steps, like a sports arena or stadium, and a row of
seats is placed on each step all the way to the back (top) of the theater. The
purported advantage of stadium style theaters is that patrons have relatively
unobstructed views because the people sitting directly in front of them are
on a lower level. The entrance to a stadium style theater is at or near the
front and able-bodied patrons climb the steps to reach the desired row.
Wheelchair users, however, cannot climb the steps, and the row set aside
for them is next to, and on the same level as, the entrance.22°
Lara and other wheelchair users contended that viewing the movie
screen from this area was very awkward and uncomfortable because it was
too close to the screen and too far below its level. An expert witness
supported this claim, stating that the average viewing angle from this row
was above thirty-five degrees which he described as "well into the
discomfort zone. '221 Accordingly, the plaintiffs argued, with the support of
DOJ as amicus curiae,that stadium style seating violated the ADA because
the viewing available to wheelchair users was not comparable to
nondisabled patrons' more comfortable "line of sight." The court agreed,
holding that the statute and regulation were clear and unambiguous and
meant that wheelchair users "should and must be afforded seating
providing lines of sight at least similar to those afforded to the average
patron of the theater ratherthan being relegatedto the worst seats in the
222
house.,

At a later hearing on proposed plans to retrofit the theaters to give
wheelchair users better sightlines, Cinemark put forward a proposal which
would bring only five of the eighteen theaters into compliance.223 It cited
the costs of retrofitting and the lost revenue due to the time the theaters
would be closed for retrofitting and the reduced seating afterward, and also
argued that it had acted "in good faith" in constructing the theater complex.
The court, however, said it was "unable to find any 'good faith' exception
to the [ADA's] requirements. 22 It stated that having found that eighteen
theater auditoriums were not in compliance, "it follows that all eighteen
must be modified .... [M]odifying only five out of eighteen auditoriums

220. See Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., No. EP-97-CA-502-H, 1998 WL 1048497, at *2 (W.D.
Tex. Aug. 21, 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2000).
221. Id. at *6.
222. Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
223. See 1999 WL 305108, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 1999).
224. Id. at *2.
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to bring them into compliance with the Americans with Disabilities
Act is
225
not satisfactory. The law requires all eighteen to be modified."

225. Id. (emphasis added). The court made it clear that it was aware of the costs of such
retrofitting. It would require each auditorium to close down, at least briefly, during the process and
would also result in some permanent loss of seating capacity, both of which would result in some
potential loss of revenue to Cinemark. Moreover, the anticipated cost of retrofitting itself was
approximately $15,000 per auditorium under Cinemark's plan and $22,000 per auditorium under
the plaintiffs' plan. Id. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed that Standard 4.33.3 applies to all
theaters, 207 F.3d at 787-88, but held that the owner complied with this regulation when it placed
the wheelchair-access area near the front of the seating area on a flat portion of the theater rather
than as a part of stadium-seating configuration. Id. at 789.
Several other suits alleging "stadium style!' seating violates the ADA, including one filed by
DOJ are currently winding their way through the courts. See generally Stadium Seating Leads to
Another Suit Against Cinema Corporation,15 NAT'LDISABILrY L. REP. HIGH11GHTs 8 (June 17,
1999) (discussing private suits challenging stadium seating); Untitled (visited July 12, 1999)
<http:llwww.usdoj.gov/crtlpnl1999/January/035cr.htm> (DOJ press release dated Jan. 29, 1999,
announcing filing of its suit against American Multi-Cinema, Inc. and AMC Entertainment,
operators of one of the nation's largest chains of movie theaters). A court rejected Cinemark's
argument that this suit should be dismissed as "duplicative" of adeclaratory judgment action it had
filed alleging that DOJ had "impermissibly, and without notice and other due process, promulgated
a new rule of law in violation of the APA." United States v. Cinemark, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 881,
885 (N.D. Ohio 1999). It also refused to grant a stay while the declaratory judgment action was
litigated. Id. at 891.
The most prominent case involving a theater chain began as a state-law suit brought before the
ADA went into effect. Two women who used wheelchairs sued the United Artists EmeryBay
multiplex, alleging that they had to sit in a "degrading and 'inferior' location behind a low wail at
the back of the theater." Sarah Thailing, A Lawsuit Spurredby the Americanswith DisabilitiesAct
Could Prove Costly to Business at Large ifJurisprudenceRules that it Is... PaydayfortheADA,
S.F. Bus. TIMES, Mar. 26,1993, at 1. The suit was removed to federal court after an ADA claim was
added, and the court certified the suit as a class action. Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Circuit,
Inc., 158 F.R.D. 439,439 (N.D. Cal. 1994). United Artists later settled the case, agreeing to provide
dispersed wheelchair seating and to modify 1%of the seats in existing theaters by installing folding
or removable aisle-side armrests installed to facilitate the transfer of wheelchair patrons into theater
seats. It also agreed to pay damages to the individual plaintiffs and to set up a fund for disabled
moviegoers. The settlement agreement can be found at Untitled (visited July 12, 1999)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/foia/md2.txt>. A court later held that the consent decree entered into as
part of this settlement collaterally estopped an individual action against United Artists. See Coates
v. Kelley, 957 F. Supp. 1080, 1087 (E.D. Ark. 1997).
The Access Board recently proposed modifying Standard 4.33.3 to explicitly require that
auditoria provide wheelchair-users with unobstructed lines of sight. 64 Fed. Reg. 62248, 62277-78
(Nov. 16, 1999). As the Access Board explained:
DOJ has asserted in attempting to settle particular cases that wheelchair seating
locations [in stadium-style theaters] must: 1) be placed within the stadium-style
section of the theater ... ; 2) provide viewing angles that are equivalent or better
than the viewing angles ... provided by 50 percent of the seats in the auditorium,
counting all seats of any type sold in that auditorium; and 3) provide a view of the
screen, in terms of lack of obstruction... that is in the top 50 percent of all seats
of any type sold in the auditorium. The Board is considering whether to include
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The court in Long v. CoastResorts,Inc.226 reached a similar conclusion,
holding that a newly-constructed casino which had wheelchair access to
only one of its three bars did not provide wheelchair users with "full and
equal enjoyment" of its facilities. In Long, wheelchair users, and a
disability rights organization alleged that The Orleans Hotel and Casino in
Las Vegas was not in compliance with the ADA with regard to its hotel
accommodations, gaming facilities, restaurant facilities and other public
accommodations. 227
The court adopted the "substantial compliance" rule, but examined each
part of the facility separately. It held that where there were several identical
accommodations, not all had to be accessible, but all accommodations
which offered a unique experience had to be accessible. 22' For example,
The Orleans had nine identically designed cabanas located around the
perimeter of the swimming pool. Six were on an accessible route but three
cabanas were located in a non-accessible area.229 The court held that the
ADA does not require every element of a place of public accommodation
to be accessible, 3 0 and stated that with "fully two-thirds of the cabanas...
accessible[,] [w]heelchair users are not denied full and equal 'enjoyment'
of the facilities merely
because three of the cabanas are not placed on the
' 231
accessible route.
The court, however, held that wheelchair users were denied full and
equal enjoyment of the hotel's bars because they had different themes but
only one of three was accessible.232 Long argued that each bar should be
specific requirements in the final rule that are consistent with the DOJ's
interpretation of 4.33.3 to stadium-style movie theaters.
Id. at 62278. The proposed regulations define the "lines of sight" problems only in the context of
obstructed views, and recognize that additional language will be necessary to codify the DOJ's
litigating position. Id.
226. 32 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (D. Nev. 1998).
227. Id. at 1205.
228. Id. at 1214.
229. Id. at 1206.
230. Id. at 1212. The court had cited PVA IV earlier and among the examples of this rule it
listed in dicta was that "every seat location in a stadium is not required to be wheelchairaccessible." Id. As discussed below, however, the court's holding makes it clear that there are
situations when all of a public accommodation must be made accessible if partial compliance does
not provide for full and equal enjoyment.
231. Id.
232. The Orleans's three bars surrounded the gaming "pit" area. The Mardi Gras bar was
accessible via a ramp and had 30 feet (360 inches) of counter area that was accessible to wheelchair
users. The Alligator bar and the Crawfish bar, however, did not have the 60-inch long portion of
counter space useable by a person in a wheelchair as required by ADAAG 5.2. Id. at 1207, 1213.
ADAAG 5.2 covers counters and bars and states that
[w]here food or drink is served at counters exceeding 34 inches (875 mm) in

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss3/1

48

Milani: "Oh, Say, Can I See--And Who Do I Sue if I Can't?": Wheelchair Us
ARCHITECTULABILITY UNDER THEADA

considered independently, but The Orleans responded that the regulation
was satisfied because all three bars were in the casino area, and one was
completely accessible.
The court disagreed, stating that it found "an analogy in a complex of
movie theaters. Arguably, all the theaters are in the same 'area,' i.e., within
the movie complex. However, each theater shows a different movie. One
would reasonably expect that wheelchair accessibility is necessary in each
theater."2'33 The court then said while each of the bars at The Orleans were
in the casino area they apparently employed different themes. It noted that
even if they serve the same drinks, the bars' ambiance may be the
attraction and people may prefer the atmosphere in one bar over another.
The court said that this was "not comparable to the cabanas discussed
above, where all are identical and provide the same amenities.
Accordingly, to receivefull and equal enjoyment of thesefacilities, there
should be wheelchairaccessibilityin each bar."'3a
Future courts faced with a proposed stadium design where some
wheelchair seats do not provide sightlines over standing spectators should
follow Independent Living Resources, Lara,and Long and require that all
seats be brought into compliance with Standard 4.33.3. Those courts held
that "substantial compliance" would not ensure "full and equal enjoyment"
of a facility because an individual with a disability could not go to the
executive suite, movie, or bar of his choice. Similarly, the fact that an arena
is in substantial compliance with Standard 4.33.3 does nothing for a
wheelchair user in a non-compliant location who cannot see the most
important parts of a game because of spectators standing in front of him.
To paraphrase Independent Living Resources, "when a person with
disabilities [buys a ticket for a game], there is only one [seat] that counts:
the one [which he bought]. It is no solace that there is a token accessible
[seat] elsewhere in the building, or for that matter if every other [seat] in
the building is accessible." ' Accordingly, future courts should reject the
"substantial compliance rule" and adopt DOJ's position that there is a
rebuttable presumption that all wheelchair seats should have sightlines
over standing spectators unless: (1) it is structurally impracticable to do so,

height for consumption by customers seated on stools or standing at the counter,
a portion of the main counter which is 60 inches (1525 mm) in length minimum
shall be provided in compliance with 4.32 or service shall be available at

accessible tables within the same area.
36 C.F.R. pt. 1191, app. A.
233. Long, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 1214.
234. Id. (emphasis added).
235. IndependentLiving Resources, 982 F. Supp. at 736.
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or (2) ambulatory spectators also do not have lines of sight over standing
spectators.236
II. LIABILITY FOR INACCESSIBLE BUILDINGS: ARE ARCHITECTS,
CONTRACTORS, AND FRANCHISORS COVERED BY THE ADA?

Determining what the law requires, however, is only half the battle. A
second question-which applies not only to new stadiums and arenas, but
to all new construction-is "Who can be held liable if a building does not
comply with the ADA?" There are several parties who could bear
responsibility for a new building's compliance with the ADA's
accessibility requirements: the architect who designs it, the contractor who
builds it, the owners and lessees who will actually use it, and, where
applicable, a franchisor/parent corporation which has the power to approve
its design.
236. PVA IV, 117 F.3d at 579. It should be emphasized that Standard 4.33.3 applies only to
new construction and alterations of existing structures. The rule which applies to existing structures
requires only that a "program, or activity, when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities." 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a). An entity is not required to make
each portion of a facility readily accessible; the question is whether the facility, when viewed in its
entirety, is readily accessible. This is known as the "program access" requirement. Preamble to
Regulation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government
Services, 28 C.F.R., pt. 35, app. A, at 492 (explaining program access requirement). In Pascuitiv.
New York Yankees, 87 F. Supp. 2d 221, 226 (S.D.N.Y, 1999), however, the court noted that the
"Standards nevertheless provide valuable guidance for determining whether an existing facility
contains architectural barriers." Id. at 226. The plaintiffs in Pascuitisued New York City, the New
York City Department of Parks and Recreation, and the New York Yankees, alleging that they had
violated the ADA by failing to make Yankee Stadium accessible to individuals with disabilities. Id.
at 222. The court held that using the Standards to determine if the Stadium complied with the ADA
did not alter the ADA's lesser requirements for existing facilities because the plaintiffs still had to
show that removal of a given barrier was "readily achievable" which is defined in 42 U.S.C. §
12181(9) as "easily accomplishable and able to be carried without much difficulty or expense."
More specifically, the plaintiffs would have to: "(1) prove that the Stadium, viewed in its entirety,
is not readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (2) suggest a plausible
method of making the Stadium readily accessible, the costs of which, facially, do not clearly exceed
its benefits." Id. at 226. The court said that "[a]llowing plaintiffs to use the Standards as part of
their effort to establish the existence of individual barriers to access does not dilute either of those
requirements." Id.
The parties settled within a week of this ruling. Greg B. Smith, DisabledYankees FansGain
Access to Stadium, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 14, 1999, at 39 (1999 WL 30030095); Robert Hardt,
Jr., DisabledScore More Seats at Yankee Stadium, N.Y. POST, Dec. 14, 1999, at 4 (1999 WL

27658779). Before the suit, Yankee Stadium had only 44 pairs of seats for the disabled, only 12 of
which had unobstructed views. The unobstructed seats cost $50, some of the most expensive in the
house. The settlement calls for the Yankees to increase the number of wheelchair seats to 400 pairs
during the next seven years. For the 2000 season, there will be 215 wheelchair-accessible seats,
with ticket prices ranging from $8 to $42.50. The Yankees and the city also agreed to alter doors,
rest rooms, telephones, ticket booths, elevators, and drinking fountains. The Yankees will pay the
U.S. government $25,000 and donate $10,000 to a charity of the plaintiffs' choice. Id.
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In both PVA I and Ellerbe Becket, however, architects argued that they
were not covered by the ADA because the statute's language limited
responsibility for complying with the accessibility standards to abuilding's
owners and operators. Architects, contractors, and franchisors have made
similar arguments in cases concerning hotels, apartment buildings, and
other new construction projects, and courts are split on the issue.237
A. Statutory Language and DOJ'sInterpretation
Liability for the accessibility of buildings is governed by Section 303(a)
of the ADA which provides:
[A]s applied to public accommodations and commercial
facilities, discrimination for purposes of section 302(a) [of
this title] includes(1)

a failure to design and constructfacilities for first
occupancy later than [January 26, 1993] that are

237. See, e.g., Johanson v. HuizengaHoldings, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1175, 1178 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
(holding that architect was subject to possible liability under ADA); United States v. Ellerbe
Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1262, 1267 (D. Minn. 1997) (holding that architects are subject to
liability forviolations of ADA); United States v. Days Inn of Am., Inc., 151 F.3d 822,825-27 (8th
Cir. 1998) (holding ADA prohibition against design and construction of facilities that are not
readily accessible is not limited to persons who own, lease, or operate facilities; that franchisor will
be liable where it has significant degree ofcontrol over final design and construction of facility; but
grant of summary judgment was improper where it was unclear whether franchisor had actual
knowledge that franchisee's hotel did not satisfy ADA requirements), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1016
(1999); United States v. Days Inn of Am., Inc., 997 F. Supp. 1080, 1083 (C,D. Ill. 1998) (holding
hotel licensing corporation and its parent "designed and constructed" new hotel and, thus, were
liable for ADA violations); Montana Fair Housing, Inc. v. American Capital Dev., Inc., 81 F. Supp.
2d 1057 (D. Mont. 1999) (holding that "design and construct" language in the Fair Housing Act
Amendments should be read broadly and architects, developers, and managers could be liable for
failing to make low-income housing projects accessible); Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel
Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 661 (D. Md. 1998) (holding contractor could be held liable under
"design and construct" language in the Fair Housing Act Amendments for failing to make a
building accessible); United States v. Hartz Constr. Co., No. 97 C 8175,1998 WL 42265 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 28, 1998) (holding architect could be held liable under the Fair Housing Act Amendments).
But see Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects, 945 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996)
(holding that architects are not liable under the ADA), aff'd on other groundssub nom. Paralyzed
Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena, L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Pollin
v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 523 U.S. 1003 (1998); United States v. Days Inn of Am., Inc., 22
F. Supp. 2d 612 (E.D. Ky. 1998) (holding hotel licensing corporation and its parent were not liable
under the ADA because they did not "design and construct" the new hotel at issue); United States
v. Days Inn of Am., Inc., 8 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 491, 493 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 1998)
(holding that § 303(a) is limited to owners, lessees, lessors, and operators), appealdocketed, No.
98-15433 (9th Cir. Mar. 17,1998); see alsoJames P. Colgate, Note, If You Build It, Can They Sue?
Architects' Liability Under Title III of the ADA, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 137 (1999) (discussing the
liability of architects for violations of the ADA).
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readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities. 238
Section 303(a) does not specify the type of entities liable if a facility is not
accessible, but does refer to section 302(a) which states: "No individual
shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who
leases to), or operates a place of public
owns, leases (or
239
accommodation.

Architects and contractors argue that they cannot be held liable under
the plain language of section 303 because they do not both design and
construct buildings nor do they own, lease, or operate them. DOJ has
stated in its Technical Assistance Manual, however, that any party which
has a significant degree of control over the design and construction of a
facility-including architects and contractors-can be held liable if it does
not comply with the ADA's standards. 2'
B. CasesHolding that the ADA 's "Designand Construct"
Language Does Not CoverArchitects
1. District Court Decision on the MCI Center
In ParalyzedVeterans of America v. Ellerbe Becket Architects (PVA
1)241 the court dismissed the architecture firm which designed the MCI
Center from the suit alleging the arena was not in compliance with the
ADA. PVA argued that section 303's reference to the design function

238. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a) (emphasis added). The importance of the inclusion of the phrase
"and commercial facilities" will be discussed infra at notes 259-65, 299-308 and accompanying
text.
239. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (emphasis added). The remainder of § 302 lists general and specific
examples of prohibited discrimination, such as denying participation, affording unequal or separate
benefits, and applying eligibility criteria which screen out the disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b).

Public accommodations are defined as entities whose operations affect commerce and fit within one
or more of twelve specific categories of public accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The ADA
defines "commercial facilities" to include all facilities intended for non-residential use whose
operations affect commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(2). "Commercial facilities" is therefore the broader
of the two categories.
240. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE AMERICANS WITH DIsABIUTIES Acr
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL § 111-5.1000 (1993). The TAM can also be found at ADA Title
12,
1999)
July
III Technical Assistance Manual (visited
<http:lwww.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/taman3.html>.
241. 945 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1996), aFfd on other groundssub non. Paralyzed Veterans of
Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. deniedsub nom. Pollin v. Paralyzed
Veterans of Am., 118 S.Ct. 1184 (1998).
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meant it included architects. The court disagreed, stating that this argument
conflicted with the plain language of the statute for two reasons.
a. "Design and Construct" Is Conjunctive and a Party Is Liable
Under the ADA Only if It Performs Both Functions
First, it stated that "the phrase 'design and construct' is distinctly
conjunctive" and "refers only to parties responsible for both functions,
such as general contractors or facilities owners who hire the necessary
design and construction experts for each project."'242 The court held that
because "architects in general, and the Ellerbe defendants in particular, are
and construction of the MCI Center,
not responsible for both the design
24 3
them.
to
refer
not
§ 303 does
b. Liability for Accessibility Problems Is Limited to a
Facility's Owners, Operators, Lessors, and Lessees
Second, the court noted that section 303 states that it defines
discrimination for purposes of section 302(a). Section 302 limits its
coverages to the owners, operators, lessees, and lessors of public
accommodations, and the court held that this limitation also applies to
section 303 and thereby excluded architects from liability under the
section. 244
The court rejected DOJ's argument in an amicus brief that its
interpretation of section 303, which includes architects as liable parties,
should be followed under the rule in Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council245 which requires that courts defer to an administrative
agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute. The court stated that an
agency interpretation is only entitled to deference when the statute is
ambiguous, 246 and no deference was required in the case before it because
the plain language of the statute made it clear that architects are not
covered by sections 302 and 303.247
Finally, the court held that its interpretation rejecting architect liability
did not frustrate the ADA's intent. It stated that "[i]f entities who are
responsible for both design and construction can be held liable for
violations of the ADA, those entities will ensure that the firms or
individuals with whom they contract-experts in design or

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
See PVA I, 945 F. Supp. at 2. "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the

matter." Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842).
247. Id.
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construction-will hew to the dictates of the statute and regulations. 248
And, if a violation did occur, the aggrieved parties could seek relief by
suing "the high-level entities responsible for both design and
construction. 249
2. District Court Decision in Days Inn-Kentucky: Liability for
Accessibility Problems Is Limited to a Facility's
Owner, Operators, Lessors, and Lessees
The court in United States v. Days Inn of America, Inc. (Days InnKentucky)25° agreed with the PVA I court, holding that section 303's
reference back to section 302 showed Congress's intent to limit liability
under section 303 to owners, operators, lessors, and lessees. 25' It said that
using section 303's "design and construct" language without the limiting
language found in section 302 would illogically result in a limit to the
reach of section 303, because it would impose liability on subcontractors,
material suppliers, and similar entities.25' It would also work against the
principle that "when two or more statutes deal with the same subject, they
are to be read in pari materia and harmonized if possible"" by
"dangerously expand[ing] the reach of §303."25 Finally, the court said that
if Congress had intended to extend liability under section 303 beyond
owners, operators, lessors, and lessees, it could easily have done so."

248. Id.
249. Id.
250. 22 F. Supp. 2d 612 (E.D. Ky. 1998). This case was one of several alleging ADA
violations the DOJ brought against Days Inn of America (DIA) and its parent corporation in courts
around the country. More information on these suits, some which are discussed below, can be found
in the DOJ's press release announcing their filing. Untitled (visited July 12, 1999)
<http:llwww.usdoj.gov/crtlfoialdiusl.txt>; see also Days Inn of Am., Inc. v. Reno, 935 F. Supp.
874, 875-76 (W.D. Tex. 1996) (outlining the history of the Days Inn litigation). An index to
specific information about the proceedings in the individual cases is found at U.S. v. Days Inn
(visited July 12, 1999) <http:llwww.usdoj.gov/crtlfoialtables.htm>. These suits were eventually
settled through a consent decree. United States v. Days Inn of Am., Inc., No. 96-26 (E.D.Ky. Dec.
2, 1999). The agreement can also be found at Settlement Agreement Under the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct Between the United States and Days Inn ofAmerica, Inc. (visited Dec. 20, 1999)
<http:llwww.usdoj.gov/crtladaldaysinn.htm>.
251. See Days Inn-Kentucky, 22 F. Supp. at 616.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 615-16 (quoting Jones v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 728 F.3d 257,262 (6th Cir.
1984)).
254. Id. at 616.
255. Id.; see also United States v. Days Inn of Am., Inc., 8 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 491,
493 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 1998) (holding that § 303(a) is limited to owners, lessees, lessors, and
operators), appealdocketed,No. 98-15433 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 1998). The Days Inn-Kentucky court
also held that DIA did not exert sufficient control over the hotel to be held liable as its "operator."
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C. Cases Holding that the ADA's "Design and Construct" Language
Can Cover Architects, Contractors,and Franchisors
1. District Court Decision in DOJ's Suit Against Ellerbe Becket
In United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc.,256 however, the court held that
architects can be held liable under the ADA. In that case, DOJ alleged that
Ellerbe had "engaged in a pattern or practice of designing new sports
arenas and stadiums across the United States that fail to comply with Title
III of the ADA,... and its implementing regulation regarding lines of sight
for disabled patrons. 257 Ellerbe moved for summary judgment arguing
that: (1) architects were excluded as potentially liable entities by the plain
language of the ADA; (2) section 303(a) of the ADA only covers entities
which design and construct facilities and "architects by definition only
design buildings;" and (3) the plain language of section 303(a) is not

22 F. Supp. 2d at 616. Two theories had been used to determine who qualified as an "operator"
under the ADA. The first test focuses on whether the franchisor "specifically controls the
modification of the franchises to improve their accessibility to the disabled." Id. (citing the test
articulated in Neff v. American Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1995)). A
franchisor is not an operator if the "franchise agreement established no more than that the
[franchisor] held the power to veto modifications to the [franchisee's] facilities." Id. TheDays InnKentucky court held that in order to be held liable as an operator under this test, "the franchisor
must in some way actually cause the franchisee to comply or not to comply with the ADA." Id. It
held that DIA did not have such power because, while its license agreement with the franchisee
gave it a "supervisory or veto power" over the hotel's construction, DIA's reviewed and approved
the plans "solely for the purpose of determining compliance with DIA's system standards and not
for determining whether those plans satisfied legal requirements such as ADA standards." Id. Also,
the agreement specified that the franchisee was responsible for constructing and operating the hotel
to comply with all legal requirements. DIA did require franchisees to comply with numerous
requirements in a manual on how to run the hotel, provide training programs for employees and
managers, and subject franchisees to quality assurance inspections, but the court held that these did
not show it had control over structural modification necessary to qualify as an operator under Neff.
Id. at 616-17.
The Days Inn-Kentucky court also held that DIA could not be classified as an "operator" under
another theory which focused on whether a franchisor maintained control over the franchise's dayto-day operations. The court found that while DIA's manual, training sessions, and ratings based
on the inspections "influence[d]" the hotel's day-to-day operations, it did not constitute "'control'
over the hotel in the ordinary sense." Id. at 617.
256. 976 F. Supp. 1262 (D.Minn. 1997).
257. Id. at 1264 (citation omitted). DOJ listed five new Ellerbe-designed arenas which failed
to comply with the ADA. In addition to the MCI Center and Rose Garden, they were the CoreStates
Arena in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; the Fleet Center in Boston, Massachusetts; and the Gund
Arena in Cleveland, Ohio. Complaint, 9, United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1262
(D. Minn. 1997) (No. 4-96-995).
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ambiguous so DOJ's interpretation of it was not entitled to deference. 258
The court rejected each of those arguments.
a. Liability for Accessibility Problems Is Not Limited to a Facility's
Owners, Operators, Lessors, and Lessees Because Such a
Reading Contravenes the Plain Language of the Statute
Ellerbe's plain language argument was that section 303's reference to
section 302(a) limited liability only to entities listed there: parties which
"own[], lease[] (or lease[] to), or operate[]" a facility which is not in
compliance with the ADA. DOJ responded with its own plain language
argument, noting that while section 302 only covered public
accommodations section 303 stated it covered "public accommodations
and commercialfacilities.,219 DOJ argued that Ellerbe's interpretation
would render section 303's express inclusion of "commercial facilities"
meaningless. Moreover, a practical application of Ellerbe's interpretation
would mean that while section 303(a) would apply to the owners or
operators of public accommodations (and commercial facilities which also
met the public accommodations definition), "no entity [would be] liable for
standards for buildings
violations of the new construction accessibility
' 26
which are commercial facilities only. 0
The court found DOJ's interpretation more persuasive. It cited
legislative history stating that "the use of the term 'commercial facilities'
is designed to cover those structures that are not included within the
specific definition of 'public accommodation.' ' 261 It concluded that
"Congress clearly intended that commercial facilities be subject to the
accessibility standards for new construction."2 62
The court also relied on the canon that "[s]tatutory language should be
construed in a manner that gives effect to all terms so as to avoid rendering
terms useless. 2 63 It stated that Ellerbe's interpretation would result in an
"inexplicable gap in coverage" for commercial facilities which "Congress
clearly intended to be covered by the accessibility standards for new

258. Id. at 1266.
259. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a) (emphasis added).
260. Ellerbe Becket, 976 F. Supp. at 1267. Public accommodations are defined as entities
whose operations affect c6mmerce and fit within one or more oftwelve specific categories of public
accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The ADA defines commercial facilities to include all
facilities intended for non-residential use whose operations affect commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(2).
Commercial facilities is, therefore, the broader of the two categories.
261. EllerbeBecket, 976 F. Supp. at 1267 (quoting H.R. Rep. 485, pt. 2, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
116 (1990)).
262. Id.
263. Id. (citing Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1990)).
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construction."'2 6" The court rejected Ellerbe's argument that this gap could
be filled by expanding the phrase "of public accommodations" in section
302(a) to include "or commercial facilities." It stated that this argument
undermined Ellerbe's position that the plain language of the statute was
unambiguous.2 6
The court also said it would have reached the same conclusion if it had
found that the statute was ambiguous. If that was the case, it would simply
defer to DOJ'
s interpretation which found that architects are covered under
2 66
the statute.
b. A Fact Issue Existed on Whether Ellerbe Becket
Participated in Both Design and Construction
Finally, the court rejected the PVA I court's conclusion that architects
never both design and construct buildings and thus could not be held liable
as a matter of law. 67 It agreed with DOJ that there was a fact issue on
whether Ellerbe participated in both the construction and design of the
arenas at issue. Accordingly, it held that it need not decide whether a party
which designed a noncompliant facility could be liable under section
303(a) if it had no involvement in constructing the facility.26
2. District Court Decision on the Broward Arena: Liability for
Accessibility Problems Is Not Limited to a Facility's Owners,
Operators, Lessors, and Lessees Because Such a Reading
Contravenes the Plain Language of the Statute
The court in Johanson v. Huizenga Holdings, Inc.,269 also held that
architects were covered under section 303's "design and construct"
language. In Johanson,a disabled minor and his father sued Ellerbe and
several other parties alleging that the Broward Arena, which Ellerbe had
designed for the NHL's Florida Panthers, was not in compliance with the
ADA. Ellerbe moved to dismiss the complaint, but the court accepted
Johanson's argument, which was supported by an amicus brief from DOJ,

264. Id.
265. Ellerbe Becket, 976 F. Supp. at 1267.
266. Id. at 1267 n.4 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
267. Id. at 1268 (citing PVA 1, 945 F. Supp. at 2).
268. Id. Shortly after the court's decision rejecting its motion to dismiss, Ellerbe entered into
a consent agreement with DOJ. Consent Order-UnitedStates of America v. EllerbeBecket, Inc.
(visited July 12, 1999) <http:llwww.usdoj.gov/crtladalellerbe.htm>. The agreement noted that
Ellerbe continued to maintain that the ADA does not provide a cause of action against architects
and stated that Ellerbe did not contest the court's jurisdiction for purposes of that agreement only.
Id.
269. 963 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
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that limiting section 303's application to parties covered by section 302
"would effectively eliminate § 303 [3]'s coverage of commercial facilities,
despite the language in § 30[3] which explicitly names 'commercial
facilities' in connection with the new construction mandate."27 ° The court
noted that "[i]f architects are not liable under the ADA, then it is
conceivable that no entity would be liable for construction of a new
commercial facility which violates the ADA." 27 '
3. Days Inn-Eighth Circuit
Similarly, in United States v. Days Inn of America, Inc. (Days Inn272 the court held that the ADA prohibition against design
Eighth Circuit),
and construction of facilities that are not readily accessible is not limited
to persons who own, lease, or operate facilities and could cover a
franchisor if it had control over the design of franchisees' facilities. DOJ
sued Days Inn of America, Inc. (DIA), alleging it violated the ADA
because the Days Inn hotel in Wall, South Dakota (Wall Days Inn) was not
designed and constructed in compliance with the ADA's accessibility
requirements. The district court granted DIA's summary judgement
motion, holding that it did not design or construct the Wall Days Inn and
was not its owner, lessor, or operator. The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding
that DIA could be liable under section 303's "design and construct"
provision. 273
DIA's franchisees, Richard and Karla Hauk, had signed a licensing

270. Id. at 1178. The quoted language refers to § 302, but it is clear from the context that it
is discussing § 303.
271. Id.
272. 151 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1016 (1999).
273. Id. at 825. DOJ also sued the architect who designed the hotel, the general contractor who
supervised construction and the hotel's owners. The three parties ultimately entered into a consent
order and agreed to bring the hotel into compliance with the ADA. United States v. Days Inn of
Am., Inc., No.: CV 96-5012 (D.S.D. June 5, 1997). A copy of the consent order can be found at
Untitled(visited July 12,1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/foialdisd2.txt:>. The consent order stated
that the architect "participated in the design and construction of the Wall Days Inn by designing the
hotel." Id. at 2-3. It also noted, however, that the architect "disput[ed] this, and contend[ed] that
he [was] not a proper party to this action." Id. at 3. He waived this issue for settlement purposes
only, and the order stated this would not constitute a waiver or admission if the architect was a party
in any future action. Id.
DOJ also reached agreements to resolve the lawsuit against the owner, architect, and contractor
of a Days Inn in Willows, California. See Untitled (visited July 12, 1999)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/crtlfoialdical2.txt> (architect); Untitled (visited July 12, 1999)
<http:llwww.usdoj.gov/crtlfoialdical3.txt>
(owner); Untitled (visited July 12, 1999)
<http:llwww.usdoj.gov/crttfoia/dical 4.txt> (contractor). Similar agreements were reached regarding
Days Inn in Fort Stockton, Texas, Untitled (visited July 12, 1999)
<http:llwww.usdoj.gov/crtlfoialditxl.txt>, and Johnson Creek, Wisconsin, Untitled (visited July
12, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/foialdiwi 1.txt>.
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agreement for the Wall Days Inn which required them to submit and obtain
written approval of the hotel's architectural plans from DIA before
proceeding; provide DIA with written notice before construction began;
obtain DIA's approval for any construction plan modifications; and allow
DIA to inspect construction while in progress. DIA also had a Planning and
Design Standards Manual (PDSM) which detailed standards for newlyconstructed hotels, including requiring franchisees to ensure ADA
compliance, The Hauks failed to comply with several of these
requirements: 1) they sent DIA's design and construction department only
four pages of preliminary plans rather than a detailed set of final
architectural plans, 2) the Hauks' architect did not receive written approval
of the preliminary plans from DIA before completing the final plans, and
3) the unapproved plans were modified during construction without DIA's
approval. A DIA representative visited the construction site twice during
the construction of the Wall Days Inn, however, and DIA representatives
also called the Hauks several times during construction.274
a. Liability for Accessibility Problems Is Not Limited to a Facility's
Owners, Operators, Lessors, and Lessees Because Such a
Reading Contravenes the Plain Language of the Statute
DIA argued that it could not be liable under the ADA because section
302's incorporation into section 303 meant that liability was limited only
to entities which "own[ed], leas[ed] (or leas[ed] to), or operat[ed]" the
facility. The court disagreed. It stated that "[c]ourts should interpret
statutory language in a manner that gives effect to all terms so as to avoid
rendering terms useless., 275 DIA's interpretation of section 303 violated
this canon because it ignored the section's reference to "commercial
facilities" and would create a gap in the ADA's coverage which went
against Congress's intent that commercial facilities be subject to the
accessibility standards for new construction. The court also said that DIA's
interpretation that only owners, operators, lessors, or lessees of public
accommodations were covered under section 303 "would leave no entity
liable for violations of the new construction accessibility
standards for
276
buildings which are commercial facilities only.,
The court rejected DIA's argument that this gap could be remedied if
section 302's language "owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of
public accommodation" was interpreted as "owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates commercialfacilities. '277 It said that this interpretation went

274. Days Inn-Eighth Circuit, 151 F.3d at 824.
275. Id. at 825 (citing Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1990)).

276. Id.
277. Id. (emphasis added).
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against the canon of statutory construction requiring courts to give effect
to the plain language of the statute.278
b. The ADA's "Design and Construct" Language Covers Any Party
Which Has a Significant Degree of Control Over the
Facility's Final Design and Construction
The Days Inn-Eighth Circuitcourt did hold that section 303's "design
and construct" language should be applied conjunctively, but agreed with
DOJ that this language should be read to cover any party which has a
"significant degree of control over the final design and construction of a
' In reaching this ruling, the court noted that the ADA does not
facility."279
specify a standard for interpreting section 303. Accordingly, it turned to
DOJ's Technical Assistance Manual which stated that architects and
contractors could be held liable for failing to design and construct
accessible facilities.2 8 The court said that the TAM supported the
government's position that any party which substantially participated in the
facility's design and construction "share[d] the responsibility if the facility
violate[d] ADA's standards.'2 It stated that it would defer to this
reasonable interpretation.282
The court also ruled, however, that there was a fact issue on whether
DIA had such control in the current case. It noted that while DIA's
Licensing Agreement gave it extensive authority to control the design and
construction process (including requiring that the hotel comply with ADA
standards) it was unclear whether it had actual knowledge of the
accessibility problems at the Wall Days Inn. The court stated that "[a]
franchisor with no knowledge that a franchisee has constructed a facility
in violation of the ADA should not suffer liability under section 303,
regardless of the franchisor's available authority to ensure ADA
compliance. ' 8 3 Accordingly, it reversed the summary judgment granted to

278. Id. (citing Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 65 F.3d 90,93 (8th Cir. 1995)).
279. Id. at 826. The court noted that the district court had discussed DIA's level of control in
determining whether DIA was an "operator" of the Wall Days Inn. The Eighth Circuit stated,
however, that while DIA did not "operate" the Wall Days Inn, it could still be liable under the ADA
because § 303's "design and construct" provision "extends beyond persons or entities that may be
operators." Id .at 826 n.4.
280. Days Inn-Eighth Circuit, 151 F.3d at 826 (citing DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE
AMERICANS WIrr DISABiLriES ACr TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL § 111-5.1000 (1993)).
281. Id.
282. Id. (citing NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251,256-57 (1995)).
It also found guidance in the Supreme Court's holding that a parent corporation could be held liable
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
if it "manag[ed], direct[ed], or conduct[ed] operations specifically related to" the violation or
compliance with CERCLA. Id. (citing United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998)).
283. Id. at 827.
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DIA by the district court and remanded the case for a determination of
whether DIA had actual knowledge that the Wall Days Inn's final design
and construction plans violated the ADA.2 84
4. Days Inn-Illinois: "Design and Construct" Should Be Read
Broadly and Covers Architects, Contractors, and Franchisors
The court in United States v. Days Inn of America, Inc. (Days InnIllinois)285 went a step farther stating that the language "'[d]esign and
construct' is a broad sweep of liability, [and] it includes architects,
builders, planners, and most definitely national hotel licensing corporations
which exist for the sole purpose of ensuring that new hotels are designed
and constructed in accordance with acceptable standards. 286 The Days InnIllinois court rejected the PVA I court's strict, conjunctive reading of
"design and construct" as too narrow and "inappropriate to carry out the
intent of the ADA." 28 7 Instead, it noted that "'[d]esign and construct' may
be read conjunctively without being read narrowly. 'Design and construct'
enforce each other in that those who design or construct also construct and
' The court then held that DIA and its former parent company
design."288
could be liable under a conjunctive reading of "design and construct,"
because they were involved with both the design and construction of the
hotel both contractually and in a supervisory role. They reviewed the
project's design during the planning stage and were involved in the
construction of the hotel through review and correspondence.289
The court also stated that DIA and its former parent could be held liable
as "operators" of the hotel, citing legislative history which showed that
Congress intended to cover corporate franchising chains under section
302's "own, lease, or operate" language. It quoted a House Committee on
Education and Labor Report which said that this language "clarif[ied] that
the owner of a public accommodation is liable for discriminatory policies.
For example, if the corporate headquarters for a chain of restaurants
designs all new restaurants to contain barriers to access, an injunction
could be brought against the corporation to enjoin the inaccessible new
construction."'
It also quoted Congressman Fish's statement that

284. Id.
285. 997 F. Supp. 1080, 1083 (C.D. Il. 1998).
286. Id. at 1083. DOJ also sued the hotel's architect and owner. They entered into a consent
order and agreed to bring the hotel into compliance with the ADA. United States v. Days Inn of
Am., Inc., No. 96-2028 (C.D. Il. June 12, 1996). A copy of the consent order can be found at
Untitled (visited July 12, 1999) <http:llwww.usdoj.gov/crtlfoialdiil2.txt>.
287. Days Inn-Illinois,997 F. Supp. at 1083.
288. Id. at 1083-84.
289. Id. at 1084.
290. Id. at 1085 (quoting A&P ADA Comm. Print 1990(28A), at 496).
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"[c]orporate headquarters would be covered to the same extent as the
operator of the accommodation. For example, corporate headquarters
could not continue to design new stores in an inaccessible manner in
violationof§ 303." 291 In light of this legislative history the court held that
DIA could be liable under section 303.292
5. Cases Interpreting "Design and Construct" Language in the
Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1988 to Cover
Architects and Contractors
Courts interpreting the Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1988's
(FHAA) mandate that new construction be accessible have also held that
architects and contractors can be liable.293 Under the FHAA, discrimination
includes: "in connection with the design and construction of covered
multifamily dwellings.., a failure to design andconstruct"such dwellings
in accordance with the
accessibility and adaptability design features
294
statute.
the
in
outlined
The Hartz court rejected an argument that the FHAA's "design and
construct' language had to be read conjunctively.
[T]he notion that [an architect and a builder] working
together, one performing the first function and the other
performing the second function, [are] thereby insulated from
liability is a frank absurdity. There is no inconsistency
whatever between reading the [FHAA] as unambiguously
requiring both faulty design and faulty construction and the
imposition of joint and several liability against codefendants
who have divided between them the responsibility for those
two functions.295
The BaltimoreNeighborhoods court reached a similar conclusion. It
said that a narrow interpretation of the "design and construct" provision
would "defeat the purpose of the FHAA by allowing architects and
builders who are involved in either the design or construction, but not both,
to escape liability when they are directly involved with covered dwellings

291. Id. (quoting A&P 136 Cong. Record D646, H2624 (May 22, 1990)) (emphasis added).

292. Id.
293. Montana Fair Housing, Inc. v. American Capital Dev., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (D.
Mont. 1999); Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 661 (D. Md.
1998); United States v. Hartz Constr. Co., No. 97 C 8175, 1998 WL 42265 (N.D. I11.Jan. 28,
1998).
294. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3) (emphasis added).
295. 1998 WL42265, at *1.
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that violate the FHAA. 2 96 It also found that the broad language of the
statute-"in connection with the design and construction.. ."--and the
lack of an express limitation on possible defendants like that in the ADA
showed that Congress intended the FHAA to impose liability on more than
just the developer or owner. The court found Rommel Builders's reliance
on Ellerbe Becket to be unpersuasive. Although the phrase "design and
construct" appears in both statutes, the court held that "the limiting
29
tto the FHAA inappropriate on
provision in the ADA renders a comparison
defendants.
possible
the issue of
D. Discussion-TheADA 's "Designand Construct" Language Covers
Architects, Contractors,and FranchisorsWho Have a Significant
Degree of Control Over a Facility'sDesign and Construction
1. The ADA's "Design and Construct" Language Is Not Limited to a
Facility's Owners, Operators, Lessors, and Lessees
Courts holding architects and franchisors cannot be held liable for
buildings which fail to comply with the ADA have said that section 303's
statement that it is defining "discrimination for purposes of § 302(a)"
necessarily means that, like section 302, it applies only to the owners,
operators, lessees, and lessors of public accommodations. 298 This
conclusion should be rejected because it ignores both the plain language
of the statute and its legislative history.
First, the plain language of section 303 states that "as applied to public
accommodations andcommercialfacilities,discrimination forpurposes of
section 12182(a) of this title includes . . . " the failure to design and
construct accessible facilities. 2" Courts focusing on section 303's
incorporation of section 302 ignore this plain reference to commercial
facilities. This contravenes the canon of statutory construction that
"[c]ourts should interpret statutory language in a manner that gives effect
to all terms so as to avoid rendering terms useless." 3'
Accordingly, the court in Ellerbe Becket correctly refused to limit
liability under section 303 to the parties listed in section 302 (the owners,

296. Id.
297. Id.; see also Montana FairHousing, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 (following Baltimore
Neighborhood, and stating that the "design and construction" language should be read broadly
"when a group of entities enters into the design and construction of a covered dwelling, all
participants are bound to follow the FHA").
298. See, e.g., Days Inn.Kentucky, 22 F. Supp. 2d 612, 615 (E.D. Ky. 1998).
299. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a) (emphasis added).
300. Days Inn-Eighth Circuit, 151 F.3d at 825 (citing Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103,
109-10 (1990)).
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operators, lessees, and lessors of public accommodations)because such a
reading "would render the inclusion of commercial facilities in § 303(a)
meaningless. 3 t The court also noted that a practical application of that
interpretation would mean that while section 303 would apply to the
owners or operators of public accommodations (and commercial facilities
which also met the public accommodations definition), "no entity [would
be] liable for violations of the new construction accessibility standards for
buildings which are commercial facilities only." 302 For example, many
office buildings do not contain places of public accommodation. Under the
interpretation proposed by those arguing against architect liability, no one
could be held accountable if such a building was not accessible. 0 3
Such an interpretation ignores legislative history which shows that
Congress specifically included "commercial facilities" in the new
construction section. For example, the Joint Explanatory Statement of the
Committee of the Conference noted that the Senate bill used the term
"potential places of employment" to describe facilities subject to the new
construction requirements, but a House amendment replaced this with the
term "commercial facilities.,, 3' 4 Even more on point is a House Education
and Labor Committee report which states that the intent of section 303 was
to extend the accessibility obligation to all newly constructed commercial
establishments. The committee noted that in many situations new buildings
would be covered as public accommodations, but stated that the phrase
"commercial facilities" was also included to ensure that all newly
constructed commercial facilities will be constructed in an accessible
manner. That is, "the use of the term 'commercial facilities' is designed to
cover those structures that are not included within the specific definition
30 5
of 'public accommodation.'

301. 976 F. Supp. at 1267.
302. Id.; see also Johanson v. Huizenga Holdings, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1175, 1178 (S.D. Fla.
1997); Days Inn-Eighth Circuit,151 F.3d at 825.
303. Another practical problem with limiting § 303 coverage to entities listed in § 302 was
identified by DOJ in its case against Ellerbe Becket. United States' Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 13 n.10, United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp.
1262 (D. Minn. 1997) (No. 4-96-995) [hereinafter DOJMemorandum].It noted that while parties
who own, operate, or lease public accommodations are in the best position to comply with the dayto-day requirements found in § 302, parties who lease or operate a facility often had nothing to do
with its initial design and construction. Id. DOJ stated that Ellerbe had not "explainfed] why
Congress would choose those parties to carry out the new construction requirements." Id.
304. H.R. CONF.REP. No. 596 at 75 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 565.
305. EllerbeBecket, 976 F. Supp. at 1267 (quoting H.R. REP. No.485, pt. 2, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 116 (1990)); see also 136 CONG. REC. H2624 (Congressman Fish stated that"[t]he Committee
also approved an amendment which extended the obligation to carry out building alterations so that
they result in accessibility in commercial facilities, as well as in public accommodations. This
amendment was intended to correct an oversight in previous bills where the alterations section only
applied to public accommodations.").
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Attempts by architects and franchisors to come up with an
interpretation of section 303 which will relieve them of liability while at
the same time not ignoring the specific mention of commercial facilities
are unpersuasive. They have argued that while the parties liable for new
construction should be strictly limited by section 302(a)' s language "owns,
leases (or leases to), or operates a noncompliant facility" that language can
also be expanded when it is imported into section 303 to include "or
commercial facilities.,, 3' This interpretation, however, goes against their
position that the plain language of the statute is unambiguous. 0 7 It also
contravenes the canon of statutory construction requiring courts to give
effect to the plain language of the statute. 0 8 Accordingly, future courts
should hold that section 303's coverage is not limited to owners, operators,
lessors, and lessees.
2. A Conjunctive Reading of "Design and Construct"
Language Covers Architects and Franchisors Who
Have a Significant Degree of Control Over a
Facility's Design and Construction
a. Architect Liability
The PVA I court held that architects could not be held liable for
buildings which do not comply with the ADA because "the phrase 'design
and construct' is distinctly conjunctive.,, 3' Thus, it "refers only to parties
responsible for both functions, such as general contractors or facilities
owners who hire the necessary design and construction experts for each
project," and because "architects... are not responsible for both the design
and the construction of [a building], § 303 does not refer to them., 310 Most
courts which have directly addressed the issue, however, have held that
while "design and construct" should be read in the conjunctive such a
reading is not an absolute bar to architect liability. Instead, they hold that
architects, franchisors, or others can be held liable if they exercise a
significant degree of control over a facility's design and construction. A
broad reading is consistent with the statutory language, canons of statutory
interpretation and legislative intent, and future courts should use this test
and determine on a case-by-case basis whether a party is covered under the
ADA's "design and construct" language.

306. Ellerbe Becket, 976 F. Supp. at 1267; see also Days Inn-Eighth Circuit,151 F.3d at 825.
307. Ellerbe Becket, 976 F. Supp. at 1267.
308. Days Inn-Eighth Circuit, 151 F.3d at 825 (citing Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Commissioner, 65 F.3d 90,93 (8th Cir. 1995)).
309. 945 F. Supp. at 2.
310. Id.
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i. A Broad Reading of "Design and Construct" Is
Consistent with the Language of the ADA
First, it is consistent with the language of the statute. In Ellerbe Becket,
DOJ noted that Congress could have written section 303 without using the
word "design" and simply made it illegal to "construct" inaccessible
facilities.311 DOJ argued that by including "design" in the statute Congress
sought to include parties involved in a building's design and not just those
who have the ultimate responsibility for its construction.312 The Building
Owners and Managers Association (BOMA) made a similar argument in
an amicus memorandum: "[T]he reference to the word 'design' in the
definition of discrimination in Section 303 obviously indicates that those
persons with design responsibilities are potentially liable., 313 BOMA noted
that owners, landlords, and building operators are typically not responsible
for the design of a building and quoted from Ellerbe's own memorandum
in support of its motion to dismiss: "[a]rchitects and engineers provide
design services for those who own, lease (or lease to), or operate public
facilities. 314
DOJ also argued that Ellerbe's narrow interpretation requiring both
design and construction could create a large loophole in the statute: the
ADA would not apply if a building was designedto comply with the ADA
but the owner and contractor departed from the design and eliminated
accessible features. In such a situation the building would not have been
both designed and constructed in violation of the ADA. DOJ argued that
such an interpretation would "effectively nullify section 303., '315 Instead,
"[ilt is more faithful to the language of the statute.., to read section 303's
use of the conjunctive 'and' to make it unlawful to design an inaccessible
facility as well as to construct an inaccessible facility. 31 6

311. DOJMemorandum, supra note 303, at 17.
312. Id.
313. Amicus CuriaeBuilding Owners and Managers Association's Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 17, United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F.
Supp. 1262 (D. Minn. 1997) (No. 4-96-995) [hereinafterBOMA Memorandum].BOMA represents
commercial office building owners and managers. Id. at 4.
314. Id. at 18 (quoting Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 9,
United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Minn. 1997) (No. 4-96-995)).
315. DOJMemorandum,supra note 303, at 18. DOJ also contended that Congress's intent to
cover the design function was also shown in one of Title III's remedial provisions which allows
private suits before an inaccessible facility is built. Id. at 18 n. 12 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 121889a)( 1)).
It argued that Congress's authorization of suits before buildings are complete-suits which would
presumably be based on the facility's design-showed the importance it placed on insuring that new
facilities are designed to comply with the ADA. Id.
316. Id. at 19. Indeed, the AIA has apparently revised its position that architects are not
covered under the plain language of the statute. The organization's Vice President of Government
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ii. A Broad Reading Is Consistent with
Rules of Statutory Interpretation
Rules of statutory interpretation also support a broad reading of the
"design and construct" language. The Supreme Court has stated that
remedial legislation should be liberally construed in order to effectuate its
purpose" 7 and, more specifically, has broadly construed remedial civil
rights statutes." 8 Courts have applied this rule to the ADA.319
iii. A Broad Reading Is Consistent with Legislative Intent
A broad reading is especially appropriate here given the clear legislative
intent. In the "findings" listed in the first section of the ADA, Congress
stated that "individuals with disabilities continually encounter various
forms of discrimination, including . . . the discriminatory effects of

Affairs, Jim Dinegar, has stated that its original stance "was not our brightest-shining moment."
Michael Cannell, Down in Front,ARCHITECTURE 116, 118 (Aug. 1999). This article can also be
found at <http:llwww.architecturemag.comlaug99/tp/prac/prac.asp>. Gilbert Oberfield, chairman
of the New York AIA's interiors committee was more blunt. "There's nowhere to hide." "We often
find ourselves in the uncomfortable position of telling owners what the law means. But it's no
longer debatable. A crime is a crime. You can't indemnify yourself." Id.
317. See, e.g., Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54,65 (1968); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332,
335 (1967).
318. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 276 (1982) (describing Title VII as a
"broad remedial measure"); Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 208 (1974) ('The
Equal Pay Act is broadly remedial, and it should be construed and applied so as to fulfill the
underlying purposes which Congress sought to achieve.").
319. See, e.g., Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 861 (Ist Cir. 1998) ('The
ADA is a 'broad remedial statute.' It is a 'familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial
legislation,' such as the ADA, 'should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes."') (citations
omitted); Ritter v. Clinton House Restaurant, 64 F. Supp. 2d 374,387 (D.N.J. 1999) ("[The] ADA
[is] a remedial statute, which should be broadly construed to effectuate its purpose of eliminating
discrimination against the disabled in our society."); Flippo v. American Home Prods. Corp., 59
F. Supp. 2d 572, 577 (E.D. Va. 1999) ('Title VII and the ADA are remedial legislation. Courts are
therefore commanded to construe these acts of Congress broadly to effectuate their purposes.");
Darian v. University of Mass.-Boston, 980 F. Supp. 77, 87 (D. Mass. 1998) ("[T]he ADA is a
remedial legislation and should be broadly construed."); Niece v. Fitzner, 941 F. Supp. 1497, 1505
(E.D. Mich. 1996) ("It is a 'familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation should
be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes.' Accordingly, a broad construction is given.., to
the ADA.") (citations omitted); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 803 (N.D. Ill.
1996) ("[C]ivil rights statutes in general are to be construed liberally to effectuate their remedial
purpose. The ADA is a civil rights statute.") (citations omitted); Civic Ass'n of the Deaf of New
York City, Inc. v. Giuliani, 915 F. Supp. 622, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("As a remedial statute, the
ADA must be broadly construed to effectuate its purpose."); Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 849 F.
Supp. 1429, 1441 n.20 (D. Kan. 1994) ("ADA is [a] remedial statute designed to eliminate
discrimination against the disabled in all facets of society, and as such must be construed
liberally."); Kinney v. Yerusalim, 812 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Pa.), aft'd, 9 F.3d 1067 (3d Cir. 1993).
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architectural... barriers...."320 It then stated that the purpose of the
ADA was "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 321
iv. A Broad Reading Is Consistent with the Common Law Rule that
Architects Are Liable to Foreseeable Users of a Building
One writer has also argued that holding the ADA does not cover
322
architects is inconsistent with common law rules on architect liability.
While architects once had a duty only to those with whom they contracted
under the doctrine of privity, it is now well-settled that architects can be
held liable for negligent design by third parties who are foreseeable users
of a building. 23 Colgate argued that if an architect can be held liable in tort
in the absence of privity, "it is both reasonable and appropriate for a civil
rights law to apply the same or a higher standard. 324
Under the common law, architects can not, even at the client's request,
violate building codes or other construction requirements, and an architect
who accedes to an owner's request to design a building in an unauthorized
manner can be held liable for professional misconduct under applicable
ethical codes.32 Indeed, inA.E.Investment Corp. v. Link Builders,Inc., the
court rejected the argument that "since an architect is a professional, his
paramount duty is to his client, and that if no duty is breached in
connection with the architect-client relationship, there is no responsibility
to third parties." 326 The court stated that:
The very essence of a profession is that the services are
rendered with the understanding that the duties of the
profession cannot be undertaken on behalf of a client without
320. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (emphasis added).
321. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
322. Colgate, supra note 237, at 160-63.
323. William D. Flatt, Note, The Expanding Liability of Design Professionals,20 MEM. ST.
U. L. REV. 611,615 (1990) ('The relegation of the privity requirement... to the dustbin of history
cleared the way for the modem approaches to design professional liability ...on the theory of
negligence in tort."); Martha C. Coleman, Liability of Design ProfessionalsforNegligent Design
andProjectManagement, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 923 (1998) (explaining theories which are used to
hold design professionals liable to third parties).
324. Colgate, supra note 237, at 161.

325.

JAMES ACRET, ARCHrrECTS AND ENGINEERS 23-24 (3d ed.

1993) (discussing the doctrine

of non-delegable duty, under which an "architect's duty to exercise professional... judgment is
nondelegable"); BRIANM. SAMUELS, CONSTRUCrION LAW 125 (1996) (describing problems arising
from clients' attempts to compromise design professionals' judgment); see also, e.g., N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS., tit. 8, § 29.1(b)(1) (1997) (defining unprofessional conduct as the "negligent
failure to comply with substantial provisions of Federal, State, or local laws, rules, or regulations
governing the practice of the profession").
326. 214 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Wis. 1974).
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an awareness and a responsibility to the public welfare. The
entire ambit of state regulations as they apply to the
profession of architecture is intended, not solely for the
protection of the person with whom the architect deals, but for
the protection of the world at large. Professionalism is the
very antithesis to irresponsibility to all interests other than
those of an immediate employer.327
The responsibility for proper design thus lies not with a building's
owners and lessors, who likely have limited knowledge of design
regulations or incentive to meet them, but with licensed architects, whose
"training and professional status place them in the best position to protect
the public by assuring that their designs safeguard life, health, and property
' Indeed, Attorney General Janet Reno
to the fullest extent possible."328
specifically emphasized architects' responsibility to the public in a speech
to a group of architects shortly after the PVA I decision: "If a client told
you to design a building with one fire exit when two are required, or to use
a design that was structurally unsound, we'd expect you to tell your client
that you could not participate in creating such a safety risk."3 29
A broad reading of section 303(a) is consistent with this responsibility.
Limiting liability to owners and lessors would allow architects to contract
away their state-imposed ethical obligations to the public, and "put
compliance with the ADA at risk by allowing building owners
to take
'330
calculated risks that non-compliant designs would escape suit.
v. Architects Are in the Best Position to
Ensure Compliance with the ADA
Finally, holding that architects are covered by the ADA is justified
because they are in the best position to ensure that a building complies
327. Id. (footnote omitted).
328. Flatt, supra note 323, at 615.
329. Cannell, supra note 316, at 118.
330. Colgate, supra note 237, at 162. Colgate also argues exempting architects from liability
would treat the ADA as something less than other civil rights laws. He notes that where a licensed
real estate professional agrees with a building owner to show apartments only to persons of certain
ethnic groups, both would be guilty of discrimination, and the broker is no less liable because the
client had requested it. Id. (citing 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 250 (1976 & Supp. 1999) (noting
that "where a realtor, engaging in [discriminatory] conduct, is acting as the agent of a codefendant,
and within the scope of [her] apparent authority, both defendants are liable to the plaintiff")).
Similarly, an employment agency cannot refuse to refer applicants of certain religions and is liable
for discrimination even if it was complying with an employer's request. Id. (citing 45B AM. JUR.
2D Job Discrimination§ 1178 (1993) (noting that "employment agencies are subject to many of
the federal and state job discrimination and other fair employment practices laws")). He then states
that "[s]o, too, in the context of the design of commercial facilities not in compliance with the
ADA, should architects be susceptible to claims of discrimination." Id.
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with the statute. Building owners hire architects because of their design
expertise, including their knowledge of ADA guidelines. In an amicus
memorandum submitted in the Ellerbe Becket case, the Building Owners
and Managers Association noted that "in a large commercial building
project, a significant amount of detailed design, engineering and drawing
work is required in order to address all of the technical requirements
contained in Title III of the ADA."33 ' The BOMA Memorandum cited
affidavit testimony which showed that "[b]uilding owners often times do
not have the technical capabilities to design a building consistent with such
requirements or sometimes even to fully comprehend the complex
documents prepared by the architects."33 2 It also said that owners' ability
to oversee ADA compliance is further diminished because many
commercial buildings are owned by pension funds or trusts who do not
actually use the buildings and whose principle purpose of ownership is
primarily investment.333 Accordingly, owners "typically retain and rely on
the expertise of architects to design and develop construction documents
for projects. 334 Indeed, the American Institute of Architects stated in an
amicus brief in the Ellerbe Becket case that "[a]rchitects
may be asked to
335
design a structure entirely from the ground up.
Given this pivotal role, the Hartz court is correct that "the notion that
[an architect and a builder] working together, one performing the [design]
function and the other performing the [construction] function, [are] thereby
insulated from liability is a frank absurdity. ' 336 Such an interpretation
would mean that these professionals who are hired for their expertise,
including their knowledge of the ADA guidelines, would bear no
responsibility if a new building is inaccessible.
The PVA I court, however, held that exempting architects from liability
would not impede the goals of the ADA because "[i]f entities who are
responsible for both design and construction can be held liable for
violations of the ADA, those entities will ensure that the firms or
individuals with whom they contract-experts in design or

331. BOMA Memorandum, supra note 313, at 5.
332. Id. at 14.
333. Id. at 6.
334. Id. at 5.
335. Amici CuriaeThe American Institute ofArchitects &The Associated General Contractors
of America's Brief in Support of Ellerbe Becket, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss at 15-16, United States
v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Minn. 1997) (No. 4-96-995) [hereinafterAIA Briet].
336. United States v. Hartz Constr. Co., No. 97 C 8175, 1998 WL42265, at *1 (N.D. II. Jan.
28, 1998); see also Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 661,
664 (D. Md. 1998) (narrow reading of the "design and construct" provision would "defeat the
purpose of the [ADA] by allowing architects and builders who are involved in either the design or
construction, but not both, to escape liability when they are directly involved with covered
[buildings] that violate the [ADA].").
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construction-will hew to the dictates of the statute and regulations.""'
And, if a violation does occur, the aggrieved parties could seek relief by
suing "the high-level entities responsible for both design and
construction .... 338
The PVA I court identified these "high-level entities" as general
contractors or facilities owners who hire architects and contractors for a
project. 339 The court offers no explanation, however, for how a facility
owner, who in all likelihood is not familiar with ADA accessibility
guidelines, "will ensure that,.. [the] experts in design or construction...
will hew to the dictates of the statute and regulations." 3 °
A simple answer might be that building owners could contractually
require that the new facility comply with the ADA341 and then bring the
architect and/or builder in as a third-party defendant when an aggrieved
party sues the "high-level entity." Indeed, the American Institute of
Architects and the Associated General Contractors of America argued as
amici in the Ellerbe Becket case that an architect's design responsibility
and a contractors's obligation for constructing a building in compliance
with the ADA should be entirely based on contract. 342 The problem with
this position is that-in addition to being inconsistent with the statutory
language which shows an intent to cover those involved in the "design" of
buildings and the common law's rejection of the privity requirement-it
does not put direct responsibility on the parties most capable of ensuring
ADA compliance and adds an extra step in any litigation if a building is
not accessible.
In fact, architects' superior position to ensure ADA compliance and the
potential to spawn additional litigation is illustrated by the behavior of the
very architecture firm which was relieved from liability by the PVA I
decision. The Independent Living Resources court described several
instances where Ellerbe officials were informed of DOJ's concerns on the
337. 945 F. Supp. at 2.
338. Id.

339. Id.
340. Id.
341. This is, in fact, a common practice. See BOMA Memorandum, supra note 313, at 7-9
(citing contractual provisions requiring architects to design buildings to comply with accessibility
guidelines including one stating that the architect agreed to "exercise professional judgment to
design the project in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).").
342. SeeAIA Brief,supra note 335, at 15-17. Indeed, the AIA went so far as to state that it was
a"judicially noticeable fact that the 'nature' of the responsibilities of both architects and contractors
depend entirely on the terms of their agreements with owners, tenants, lessors, and operators of
commercial facilities." Id. at 14. It should be noted, however, that the AIA has now apparently
moved away from this position. After the Ellerbe Becket decision, Gilbert Oberfield, chairman of
the New York AIA's interiors committee stated: "There's nowhere to hide. We often find ourselves
in the uncomfortable position of telling owners what the law means. But it's no longer debatable.
A crime is a crime. You can't indemnify yourself." Cannell, supra note 316, at 118.
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sightlines over standing spectators issue and either discounted the
importance of that information, suggested that Oregon Arena seek advice
from its own legal counsel, or simply failed to share the information it had
obtained from DOJ with Oregon Arena officials. For example, as early as
September 1991, Oregon Arena's senior project manager discussed
sightlines over standing spectators with Ellerbe employees and was told
that this issue was "something the disabled community always asks for but
does not get."343 Ellerbe did send several letters to Oregon Arena over the
next three years, advising it of DOJ's position as expressed in letters to the
owners of other arenas, and advised it to contact its own counsel for a legal
opinion on the issue. Ellerbe did not, however, tell Oregon Arena of
information it received from DOJ on sightlines over standing spectators
during discussions about the design of facilities for the Atlanta Olympics.
When Oregon Arena later accused Ellerbe of withholding information
on DOJ's interpretation of the ADA regulations, Ellerbe responded that
such information was confidential and could not be shared with other
clients or even within its own office because it was acquired during
meetings with DOJ officials about the Atlanta Olympic facilities. 34 The
court was skeptical of the confidentiality claim, and stated that "[i]f, as a
result of discussions with DOJ officials regarding the Atlanta project,
Ellerbe Becket had reason to believe that the Rose Garden design did not
comply with the ADA, it would seem that Ellerbe Becket had an obligation
to communicate those concerns to its client., 345 For the purpose of deciding
the case before it, the court imputed Ellerbe's knowledge regarding DOJ's
interpretation of the ADA requirements to its principal, Oregon Arena. It
made no "binding pronouncements upon the propriety of Ellerbe Becket's
conduct," however, citing potential litigation between Oregon Arena and
its architect. a 6
While the facts in IndependentLivingResourcesare far from the typical
relationship between architect and owner, they nonetheless illustrate a
building owner's reliance on an architect's expertise. They also show the
potential extra step in any litigation if the procedures suggested in the PVA
I opinion are followed. If architects are covered by the ADA, all liability
343. Independent Living Resources, 982 F. Supp. at 749.
344. Id. at 754. Ellerbe's vice president and technical director also made it clear, though, that
he did not share the information primarily because he disagreed with DOJ's position. Gordon Wood
stated that he did not believe the ADA required sightlines over standing spectators and that DOJ's
view was "just their opinion." DOJ Memorandum, supra note 303, at 7 n.5 (quoting deposition
testimony from the Independent Living Resources case). Wood made a similar statement in a
deposition given in the PVA case. He said that he did not consider DOJ's position authoritative and
had "chose[n] to disregard it." Id. at 6. Accordingly, he did not inform the design teams for the MCI
Center and Rose Garden of the DOJ position.
345. Independent Living Resources, 982 F. Supp. at 754-55.
346. Id. at 755.
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issues concerning the accessibility of a facility can be handled in one
action. If they are not, it is almost certain that a building owner sued
because a facility is not in compliance will initiate a separate action against
the architect.
That extra step is inconsistent with Congress's intent in passing the
ADA. As DOJ pointed out in its reply to the AIA Brief in Ellerbe Becket,
the drafters of the ADA understood that retrofitting a building can be very
expensive and therefore required that new facilities be designed and
constructed to be accessible when they open.347 Limiting remedies against
architects to actions filed by a building's owner after it has been
determined a facility does not comply with the ADA goes against
"Congress' desire to get it right from the beginning, and avoid costly
'
retrofitting."348
This extra litigation and potentially costly retrofitting can be avoided
by adopting a broader reading of "design and construct." As discussed
above, "[i]t is more faithful to the language of the statute.., to read
section 303's use of the conjunctive 'and' to make it unlawful to design an
inaccessible facility."' 9 Accordingly, courts should defer to DOJ's
reasonable interpretation of this language which states that parties who

347. United States' Reply to Memorandum of Amici CuriaeAmerican Institute of Architects
and Associated General Contractors of America at 6, United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F.
Supp. 1262 (D. Minn. 1997) (No. 4-96-995) [hereinafter DOJ Reply Memorandum]. Colgate
expressed similar concerns in his article. He noted:
From a public policy perspective, finding architects liable for non-compliant
design is likely to serve as a powerful deterrent, resulting in more careful
incorporation of ADA standards into the design of buildings, a greater number of
compliant facilities, and thus fewer lawsuits. Additionally, front-loading the cost
of compliance with the ADA will result in a more efficient allocation of resources
by avoiding the greater cost of reconstructing non-compliant newly-built facilities.
Thus, society as a whole would save the dead-weight costs associated with
rebuilding facilities constructed in non-compliance, ensuing litigation costs, and
not having the use of the structures during the reconstruction necessary to retrofit
them with accessibility features.
Colgate, supra note 237, at 162.
348. DOJ Reply Memorandum,supra note 347, at 7. DOJ also pointed to practical limitations
building owners could face in suing an architect or contractor after the completion of a project: a
statute of repose may have run or the architect or contractor could have left thejurisdiction, lacked
adequate resources, or have had inadequate liability insurance. Id. at 6.
349. DOJ Memorandum, supra note 347, at 19. The Days Inn-Illinois court also showed a
broad reading of § 303 is possible. It rejected the PVA I court's strict, conjunctive reading of
"design and construct" as too narrow and "inappropriate to carry out the intent of the ADA." 997
F. Supp. at 1083. Instead, it held that .'[d]esign and construct' may be read conjunctively without
being read narrowly. 'Design and construct' enforce each other in that those who design or
construct also construct and design." Id. at 1083-84.
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substantially participate in the design and construction of an inaccessible
building, including architects, may be found jointly liable for violating the
ADA.350

350. Days Inn-Eighth Circuit, 151 F.3d at 826 (citing NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251,256-57 (1995)). More specifically, courts should reject the AIA's argument
that this interpretation is not entitled to deference because it is inconsistent with DOJ's position in
its response to comments on the proposed regulations. AIA Brief, supra note 335, at 12-14. The
AIA noted that the draft regulations proposed at 28 C.F.R. § 36.401(a)(1) stated that "any public
accommodation or otherprivateentity responsible for design and construction" was responsible
for ensuring that public accommodations and commercial facilities were accessible. Id. at 12
(quoting 56 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7489 (Feb. 22,1991) (emphasis supplied)). Afterreceiving comments
on the proposed legislation, however, DOJ dropped the reference to "other private entity." It stated
that:
Various commenters suggested that the proposed language was not consistent with
the statute because it substituted "private entity responsible for design and
construction" for the statutory language; because it did not address liability on the
part of architects, contractors . . . , and other entities.... In response, the
Department has revised the paragraph to repeat the language of section 303(a) of
the ADA. The Department will interpret the section in a matter consistent with the
intent of the statute and with the nature of the responsibilities of the various
entitiesfor design, for construction, orfor both.
56 Fed. Reg. 35,544, 35,574-75 (July 16, 1991) (emphasis supplied).
Despite the clear statement in the last sentence that DOJ interpreted the statute to impose
liability for entities responsible for either design or construction, the AIA argued that it was not
entitled to deference because the comment taken as a whole indicated simply that DOJ's regulation
would be consistent with the plain meaning of the statute. AIA Brief,supra note 335, at 13.
Courts should reject this argument. While the final regulation does not mention "other private
entit[ies]," the language "for design, for construction, or for both" nonetheless makes it clear that
entities which only design: or construct can be held liable. Accordingly, the DOJ interpretation in
the TAM does not conflict with the interpretation in the proposed regulation. That interpretation
is entitled to deference and courts should hold that architects are subject to liability under § 303 of
the ADA.
Indeed, even the AIA now apparently concedes that architects are covered by the ADA. After
the Ellerbe Becket decision, Gilbert Oberfield, Chairman of the New York AIA's interiors
committee stated: "We often find ourselves in the uncomfortable position of telling owners what
the law means. But it's no longer debatable. A crime is a crime." Cannell, supra note 316, at 118.
The AIA's chief critique of DOJ now is that while architects want to conform with the law DOJ
will not tell them how. The AIA's Vice President of Government Affairs, Jim Dinegar, says,
"Architects want to comply with ADA, but the Justice Department stonewalls us every time we ask
for clarification. It's like musical chairs, and architects are the ones left standing." Id. at 117-18.
He adds: "We're trying to comply, but Justice leaves us guessing at every turn, and then they call
us on the carpet. We're nine years into a major piece of legislation and these kinks still haven't been
worked out." Id. at 118-19. Dinegar complained that the only sure way to know if a building has
a problem is if the government files a complaint.
An amicus brief filed by the AIA in the Laracase argues that architects should not have to wait
that long, at least in jurisdictions where DOJ has certified that the state building code complies with
the ADA and the local building inspector approved the building as ADA compliant. See Amicus
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b. Franchisor Liability
DOJ' s position that franchisors who play a substantial role in the design
and construction of a facility are subject to liability is also entitled to
deference. The arguments for a broad reading of section 303 discussed
above apply equally to franchisors as well as architects. Moreover, there
is also legislative history on point.
The House Judiciary Committee amended section 302(a) so that it
applied to "any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place
of public accommodation. 3 5 ' In its report, the Committee explained:

CuriaeAmerican Institute of Architects, Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2000)
[hereinafter AIA Lara Brief]. The ADA's certification provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1)(A)(ii),
provides that state and local entities may obtain certification from the Attorney General that their
building codes meet or exceed the ADA's requirements. The implementing regulations for the
statute are found at 28 CY.R. § 36.601 et seq. See also Certificationof State and Local Building
Codes (visited Dec. 22, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/crtlada/certcode.htm> (describing
certification process). So far only four states (Texas, Maine, Washington, and Florida) have made
it through the DOJ's lengthy review process, but eight other jurisdictions have also submitted codes
for certification review and DOJ is reviewing several model codes. Id.
In its amicus brief in Lara, the AIA argues that architects whose plans and applications have
been approved under a certified building code should have a "safe harbor" from liability. AIA Lara
Brief, at 2, 10. It points to language in both the regulations and DOJ press releases to support this
position. For example, the regulations state that "[a]t any enforcement proceeding under title III of
the Act, such certification shall be rebuttable evidence that such State law or local ordinance does
meet or exceed the minimum requirements of title III." 28 C.F.R. § 36.602, quoted in AIA Lara
Brief, at 8. A DOJ press release is more specific, stating that architects would be "entitled to
additional legal protection if they built in compliance with the certified code, but are later sued
under the ADA." #237:05-27-98FloridaBuildingCode Foundto Be Equivalent to FederalAccess
Requirements (visited Dec. 22, 1999) <http:l/www.usdoj.govopa/pr/19981May/237cr.htm.html>
(quoted in AIA Lara Brief, supra, at 10). Pointing to this language, the AIA argues that
"[c]ertification was intended to be a safe harbor for architects who attempted to comply with the
ADA by working with local code officials." AIA Lara Brief, at 10.
Though not cited in the AIA's brief, there is some support for such a position. See, e.g., Seibert
v. Bayport Beach & Tennis Club Ass'n, Inc., 573 So. 2d 889, 892 (Fla. Ct. App. 1990) (architect
who designed condominium development fulfilled his duty to design second-floor units so that their
fire exits complied with code by first determining that in his professional opinion only one exit was
required from such units and then obtaining and relying on city building permit). In negligence
cases, however, courts have held that compliance with the building code does not automatically
preclude a finding of a design defect. See, e.g., Beeks v. Joseph Magnin Co., 14 Cal. Rptr. 877, 880
(Ct. App. 1961); Christou v. Arlington Park-Washington Park Race Tracks Corp., 432 N.E.2d 920,
924 (Il1.Ct. App. 1982); Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723,728 (Utah 1985). The plaintiffs in Lara
argued that the defendant/owner's remedy was to bring a separate action or cross claim against the
city and/or the state. AIA Lara Brief, at 12. For a general discussion of this type of action, see
Thomas M. Fleming, Annot., Municipal Liability for Negligent Performance of Building
Inspector'sDuties, 24 A.L.R. 5TH 200 (1994).
351. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(III), at 55 (1990).
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This amendment makes it clear that the owner of the building
which houses the public accommodation, as well as the owner
or operator of the public accommodation itself, has
obligations under the Act.... [I]f the corporateheadquarters
for a chain of restaurantsdesigns all new restaurantsto
contain barriersto access, an injunction [could be brought
against the] corporation to enjoin the inaccessible new
352
construction.
In addition, testimony before the House Judiciary Committee shows
that hotel chains were aware of their potential liability during the drafting
of the statute. One of the witnesses, James A. DiLuigi, testified on behalf
of the American Hotel and Motel Association (AH&MA) which represents
all the major hotel chains and many independent properties.353 While not
directly addressing the architect/franchisor liability issue, DiLuigi made it
clear that the hotel chains were aware of their responsibility for design
decisions. 354 He noted that the AH&MA, the Marriott Corp., and other
hotel corporations had worked with the PVA for two years to develop a
design guideline addressing the public areas in hotels and motels. 355 And,
in his concluding comment, he said, "I'd just like to say that we know
about this subject. We've been working on it and continue to work on it.
We applaud the legislation and we 3ask
for a balanced approach in
6
developing the tools to make it work.
Given this legislative history, the court in Days Inn-Illinoiswas correct
in stating that "'[d]esign and construct' is a broad sweep of liability, [and]
includes architects, builders, planners, and most definitely national hotel
licensing corporations which exist for the sole purpose of ensuring that
new hotels are designed and constructed in accordance with acceptable
standards., 35 7 The Days Inn-Eighth Circuitcourt was correct in limiting
this liability, however, where, regardless of the franchisor's available
authority to ensure ADA compliance, the franchisor
has no knowledge that
358
a franchisee constructed an inaccessible facility.

352. Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, Congressman Fish stated that "[c]orporate headquarters
would be covered to the same extent as the operator of the accommodation. For example, corporate
headquarterscould not continue to design new stores in an inaccessiblemanner in violation of
section 303." 136 CoNG. REC. H2624 (1990) (emphasis added).
353. Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990, Hearingon H.R. 2273 Before Commission on
the JudiciaryHouse of Representatives, 101st Cong. 125 (1989) (statement of James A. DiLuigi,
AIA,Director, Technical Information, Marriott Corp.).
354. Id. at 125-28.
355. Id. at 127.
356. Id. at 128.
357. 997 F. Supp. at 1083.
358. 151 F.3d at 827. The suits against Days Inn were eventually settled through a consent
decree. United States v. Days Inn of Am., Inc., No. 96-26 (E.D.K.Y. Dec. 2, 1999). The agreement
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III. CONCLUSION
Wheelchair users who have sued to ensure that they will be able to
actually see the most exciting part of a game have largely been
disappointed because most courts have held that DOJ's interpretation of
Standard 4.33.3 requiring sightlines over standing spectators is not
enforceable, 3 9 and even those which have held that it is enforceable have
stated that "substantial compliance" is sufficient. 360 Future courts, however,
should grant deference to the Technical Assistance Manual's lines of sight
over standing spectators requirement, and there should be a rebuttable
presumption that all wheelchair seats should be in compliance.
Deference is warranted because the sightlines requirement is a
reasonable interpretation of Standard 4.33.3. A complete view is obviously
more comparable to ambulatory spectators' view than is no view. Such a
reading is also consistent with the ADA policy of bringing individuals with
disabilities into the mainstream of American life because wheelchair users
are unlikely to attend sporting events if they cannot see the most important
parts of the game.
While the Access Board left the sightlines over standing spectators
question open, DOJ's interpretation requiring such sightlines is an
interpretive rule exempt from the notice and comment requirement of the
Administrative Procedure Act. Notice and comment are only necessary if
"the [later] rule would have to be inconsistent with another rule having the
force of law, notjust any agency interpretation regardless of whether it had
been codified.,36' The TAM requirement of sightlines over standing
spectators is not inconsistent with another rule having the force of law
because Congress never mandated that DOJ follow the Access Board's
guidelines. It only required that the "[s]tandards included in regulations
issued.., be consistent with the minimum guidelines and requirements
issued by the... Board., 362 The 1994 TAM supplement is an interpretive
rule because it merely clarifies and explains DOJ's interpretation of one of
those regulations: Standard 4.33.3.
Requiring only "substantial compliance" with that interpretation's
sightlines over standing spectators rule is inconsistent with the ADA's
language and intent. "Substantial compliance" does not ensure "full and
can also be found at SettlementAgreement Underthe Americanswith DisabilitiesAct Between the
United States and Days Inn of America, Inc. (visited Dec. 20, 1999)
<http:llwww.usdoj.gov/crtladaldaysinn.htm>.
359. See supra notes 117-71 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 210-31 and accompanying text.
361. Chief Probation Officers v. Shalala, 118 F.3d 1327, 1337 (9th Cir. 1997) (White, J.,
retired, sitting by designation).
362. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(c) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
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equal enjoyment" of a facility because an individual with a disability in a
non-compliant location cannot see the most important parts of a game
because of spectators standing in front of him.
The persons responsible for ensuring such compliance include
architects, contractors, and franchisors who have a significant degree of
control over a facility's design and construction. The ADA's "design and
construct" language is not limited to a facility's owners, operators, lessors,
and lessees because such an interpretation "would render the inclusion of
'
commercial facilities in § 303(a) meaningless."363
A broad reading of "design and construct" is consistent with the
language of the ADA. By including "design" in the statute, Congress
sought to include parties involved in a building's design and not just those
who have the ultimate responsibility for its construction. It is also
consistent with the rule that remedial legislation should be liberally
construed in order to effectuate its purpose, which for the ADA was "to
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities."3 ( Finally, it is
consistent with the common law. While architects once had a duty only to
those with whom they contracted under the doctrine of privity, it is now
well-settled that architects can be held liable for negligent design by third
parties who are foreseeable users of a building.365 If an architect can be
held liable in tort in the absence of privity, "it is both reasonable and
366
appropriate for a civil rights law to apply the same or a higher standard."
Moreover, architects are in the best position to ensure compliance with
the ADA. Detailed design, engineering, and drawing work are required to
address the requirements contained in the ADAAG, and most building
owners do not have the technical capabilities to successfully do so. Given
this pivotal role, the Hartz court is correct that "the notion that [an
architect and a builder] working together, one performing the [design]
function and the other performing the [construction] function, [are] thereby
insulated from liability is a frank absurdity."367 Such an interpretation
would mean that these professionals who are hired for their expertise,
including their knowledge of the ADA guidelines, would bear no
responsibility if a new building is inaccessible. It would also add an extra
step in any litigation if a building is not accessible because the builder

363. United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1262, 1267 (D. Minn. 1997).
364. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
365. See Coleman, supra note 323 (explaining theories which are used to hold design
professionals liable to third parties); Flatt, supra note 323, at 615 ("he relegation of the privity
requirement and the acceptance rule to the dustbin of history cleared the way for the modem
approaches to design professional liability.., on the theory of negligence in tort.").
366. Colgate, supra note 237, at 161.
367. 1998 WL42265, at*1.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss3/1

78

Milani: "Oh, Say, Can I See--And Who Do I Sue if I Can't?": Wheelchair Us
ARCHITECTLIABITY UNDER THEADA

would likely file a separate action against the architect.
Finally, the arguments for a broad reading of the ADA's "design and
construct" language apply equally to franchisors as well as architects.
There is also legislative history which shows that Congress intended that
headquarters of chains which design public
language to cover3 6corporate
8
accommodations.

368. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(111), at 479 (1990).
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